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To some Aboriginal people domestic Canadian law is alien and oppressive. In
this paper one source of this perception is explored, the argument digging below
the surface of the law to layers of theory and world-view which conflict with the
sensibilities of Aboriginal peoples.
I argue that a liberal vision underlies and animates the law, and that while
grounded in this vision, the law cannot protect the interests of Aboriginal
peoples. In analyzing how the law approaches the protection of Aboriginal
interests, an alternative liberal argument focused on group autonomy is also
considered. Examining the debate between liberal theorists about how best to
protect Aboriginal interests reveals the threat liberalism in general presents to
Aboriginal peoples. In adhering to deeper shared visions about the self, the
community and the state, and in engaging in the shared mission of transposing
these visions onto the lives and worlds of Aboriginal peoples, liberal theorists
reveal liberal theory as one source of the perception of oppression.
The perception that the law is oppressive ultimately issues, however, from
the law’s grounding in a particular intellectual tradition. In exploring an
approach highly critical of liberal legal theory, in tracing connections and
commonalities between the philosophical groundings of both liberal and critical
legal theory, this line of inquiry highlights the cultural divide between Western
theorists and the worlds of Aboriginal peoples. Working towards a world in
which Aboriginal interests can be appropriately protected does not mean
translating these interests into group rights so they can be fit into the matrix of
rights in Canada, just as it does not mean understanding these rights as
reflective of group autonomy, and does not mean recognizing that the “fluid and
dynamic” interests of Aboriginal peoples can be better served through
progressive democratic measures. Rather it is essentially a matter of respecting
the ability of Aboriginal peoples to continue to define who they are, a potential
for self-definition which includes their capacity to project both their own theories
and their particular forms of knowledge.

I

INTRODUCTION: PERCEPTIONS OF THE LAW

Over the last few decades hundreds of Aboriginal people have moved into the
legal field, as lawyers, judges and legal scholars. Many question their roles
within the system, yet feel compelled to continue on. Aboriginal jurists
commonly perceive the law as alien and oppressive1—not “our” law, but
“colonial law,” that of the “oppressor.”
1.

Mary Ellen Turpel, “Home/Land” (1991) 10 Can. J. Fam. L. 17 [hereinafter “Home/Land”] and
“Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian Charter: Interpretative Monopolies, Cultural Differences”
(1989-90) 6 Can. Hum. Rts. Y.B. 3 [hereinafter “Interpretative Monopolies”]; Patricia MontureAngus, Journeying Forward: Dreaming First Nations’ Independence (Halifax: Fernwood, 1999)
[hereinafter Journeying Forward]; John Borrows, “Domesticating Doctrines: Aboriginal Peoples
after the Royal Commission” (2001) 46 McGill L.J. 615 and “Sovereignty’s Alchemy: An Analysis
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Non-Aboriginals may find this perception confusing, for they likely think of
the law as one of the few institutions in Canada which by and large works for the
benefit of Aboriginal peoples, protecting Aboriginal rights from interference
both from the government and Canadian society. Those with some historical
knowledge may agree there is little to commend in the history of the law in
Canada, but would most likely argue this is only history, that today the law
shines as a beacon of hope for all Canada’s Aboriginal peoples.2 Undoubtedly
many who have such a view of the law recognize contemporary challenges
facing those who would champion Aboriginal causes within the law.
Nevertheless, the general non-Aboriginal perception seems to be that the law has
acknowledged Aboriginal rights, and that the fundamental challenge centres on
working out the appropriate crystallization of these rights in the Canadian
legal/political landscape.
Clearly someone’s perceptions are mistaken. Either the law is an institution
protecting the interests of Aboriginal peoples (however imperfectly at the
moment), or the law maintains conditions of oppression. This paper explores one
source of the common Aboriginal perception, investigating and developing an
argument to the effect that the law not only commonly fails to adequately protect
the interests of Aboriginal peoples (that it does not merely operate “accidentally”
to hinder the aspirations of Aboriginal peoples), but that given its theoretical
underpinnings it cannot but fail to protect these interests.
The domestic legal system as an institution is a social and historical
construct, a structure built of words and meanings, designed to promote certain
values in an ordering system.3 The construct itself is grounded in a vision of how
Canadian society should be structured and how the law as an integral component
of society should work within this structure. This vision is the product of
centuries of Western thought, as generations of Canadian (and Imperial) lawmakers have worked out how they think modern societies should be constructed,
and, in particular, how the modern Canadian state should be constituted.
Canadian society is the product of centuries of visioning and re-visioning how
this particular nation-state, (first a colony, then a parliamentary democracy, now
a constitutional democracy) should be structured. While individuals within this
historical intellectual tradition may each have had different views about how the
law should work within the ever-evolving nation-state, broad principles and
values came to form the fabric out of which is woven modern Canada and its

2.

3.

of Delgamuukw v. British Columbia” (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 537 [hereinafter “Sovereignty’s
Alchemy”]; Taiaiake Alfred, Peace, Power, Righteousness: An Indigenous Manifesto (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1999) [hereinafter Peace, Power, Righteousness]; James (Sákéj)
Youngblood Henderson, “Postcolonial Indigenous Legal Consciousness” (2002) 1 Indigenous Law
Journal 1.
Some would even go beyond this, arguing that the law currently functions to unfairly benefit
Aboriginal peoples, that it offers special unwarranted protection for questionable rights. See, for
example, Tom Flanagan, First Nations? Second Thoughts (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University
Press, 2000).
I am not here committing to the social construction thesis that the law as a whole is nothing more
than a social construction. The elements I listed, on the other hand, are all clearly human constructs
and dependent for their form and content on notions about how the law ought to function.
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legal system. It is this broad vision, incorporating (however imperfectly)
particular principles about the nature of the good and the right, principles
themselves grounded in theories of the self, the community and the state, that
comprises the theoretical underpinning of the law.
Here I endeavour to look below the law, to that substrata of vision which
brings life to the law and is framed in terms of theory. It is underlying theory
which attempts to channel Aboriginal aspirations into new forms and paths, and
which some Aboriginal people maintain remains as the core of colonialism in
Canada. This substrata of vision is provided by liberalism, with liberal legal
theory giving structure and coherence to the law in Canada.4 One argument I
advance here is that, as a liberal institution, the law cannot protect the essential
interests of Aboriginal people.
My critique aims to probe below liberal structures, to explore deeper theories
about the self, the community and the state upon which liberal theory rests. In
doing so, the thesis expands to advance the argument that it is not so much that
liberalism lacks the capacity and legitimacy to adequately address the needs and
wants of Aboriginal communities, but that as one thread emerging from a
particular cultural and intellectual history, legal liberalism merely illustrates the
danger posed when a legal theory grounded in one intellectual history and
tradition attempts to cast its web of principles, values and fundamental
arguments onto the lives of peoples grounded in separate and unique cultural and
intellectual histories. It is this fundamental intellectual colonialism that underlies
the perception that while the law now ostensibly protects “Aboriginal rights,” it
remains alien and oppressive.

II

LAW AND THEORY

Approaching the Law From Various Critical Perspectives
The law is always “ought” momentarily crystallized, as it expresses one set of
values captured in a system meant to promote these values in a society desirous
of living in and through them. As an institution whose purpose is to bring a
certain kind of order to relationships between people, between people and
resources, and between people and the state, snapshots can be taken such that the
order can be studied and internally criticized. Nevertheless, the law itself is not a
4.

To say theory gives structure and coherence to the law, that it underlies the law, is not to say
ideology (understood as a system of biased beliefs operating through an institution) underlies the
law. Any humanly constructed instrument with a purposeful design is constructed in accord with
some sort of architectural plan. This plan has to have some vision of how this instrument is to
function, and so one must say the law is designed to further certain values and aims. I am loosely
using the term “theory” to point to that plan. The theory underlying the law is not itself a system of
biased beliefs. However, one might argue—even persuasively—that below this theory-determined
institution lies another sub-level, that the aims and values around which the architectural plan is
conceived are not those the law actually advances (when operating as intended), which would be to
move towards the notion that at its root the law is an ideological instrument. While this sort of
suggestion lies just below the surface in this paper, it is not what the paper is meant to argue for.
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lifeless monolith whose inner nature is to be discovered and described, but a
normative theoretical construct constantly being created and reinforced from
within, constantly asserting that these values ought to be promoted in this way.5
Most modern theorists write prescriptive texts, for they begin with the
presumption that the law is a social construct, malleable and instrumental in
nature. These theorists embrace visions of an ideal world, however incomplete or
incoherent their particular visions may be. They measure the law according to its
fit with their theories about the good and the right. While they may not have at
hand visions of systems up to the task of replacing that which they criticize (and
many criticize on the basis that the law fails to satisfactorily promote the values
society has tried to advance in generating this particular legal system), they
identify a clash between the system they study and the values and principles they
believe it ought to promote.
There are two sorts of prescriptive analysis with which a scholar might
engage. On the one hand, scholars might undertake to criticize the law from the
standpoint of the very theory about the good and the right it purports to embody.
These scholars agree the law ought to promote the values and principles it has
been designed around, but find fault with how this project of building a world of
crystallized value has been carried out. This I call “internal prescriptive
criticism.” On the other hand, scholars may find fault with the very theory about
the good and the right underlying the law as it currently exists. There are any
number of independent theories about the good and the right at play in the
Western world, any one of which could serve as underpinning for the law as a
social institution. Scholars arguing that the law ought to be designed around
values and principles contained within one of these other theories would be
engaged in what we could term “external prescriptive criticism.”
There are also theories about the good and the right to be pulled out of
intellectual traditions that rest on philosophical grounds completely independent
of the intellectual traditions of the West. Gazing at Canadian domestic law from
these vantage-points may be to look across a chasm. This chasm is the result not
only of the fact that theorists exploring from a non-Western perspective are not
clearly members of the community from which issue both dominant legal theory
and “standard” critical alternatives, but also from the lack of culturally-shared
histories and philosophies. Thus, criticisms launched from these non-Western
foundations may differ not only on intellectual grounds, but on culturally
determined perspectival grounds.
In exploring the perception of some Aboriginal people that domestic
Canadian law is alien and oppressive, we begin with a description of the law, a
description which articulates that vision of society which animates the law,
5.

Those who purport to engage in “doctrinal analysis” are typically engaged in what could be
characterized as a form of prescriptive theorizing, as they engage in analysis of doctrine for the
purpose of pointing out areas of internal incoherence or inconsistency, and as such study and
criticize from a perspective promoting values of consistency and coherence. See Vincent Wellman,
“Authority of Law” in Dennis Patterson, ed., A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1996) 573 [hereinafter “Authority of Law”].
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giving it life and guidance. In unpacking how the law approaches the question of
the protection of Aboriginal interests, we also consider an internally critical
perspective, the perspective of a liberal theorist, examining an argument to the
effect that the liberal project must be rethought, as more must be done to further
the aim of protecting Aboriginal culture by respecting the autonomy of
Aboriginal communities. In examining this sort of internal criticism, however,
we will begin to see how debate between liberal theorists about how best to
protect Aboriginal interests masks the threat liberal theory presents to Aboriginal
peoples. In adhering to deeper shared visions about the self, the community and
the state, and in engaging in the shared mission of transposing these visions onto
the lives and worlds of Aboriginal peoples, liberal theorists reveal liberal theory
as the problem, not as a source of any acceptable solution.
To flesh out this problem, an approach critical of liberal legal theory is
examined. Teasing out the connections and commonalities between the
fundamental groundings of both liberal and critical legal theory underscores the
cultural divide between (a) philosophies underlying both domestic law and
suggestions for reform and (b) Aboriginal lives and worlds. It is not a problem of
working out how Aboriginal interests can be translated into group rights and fit
into the matrix of rights in Canada, just as it is not a problem of understanding
these rights as reflective of group autonomy, and not a matter of recognizing that
the “fluid and dynamic” interests of Aboriginal peoples can be better served
through progressive democratic measures. Rather, it is essentially a question
about the ability of Aboriginal peoples to continue to define who they are, a
potential for self-definition which includes their capacity to project their own
theories and particular forms of knowledge.

Underlying the Law: Liberalism and Liberal Theory
When we turn our gaze to the law in Canada we witness an institution built on a
bedrock of liberal values and principles, with legal theorizing, both descriptive
and internally prescriptive, centred around liberalism. This is understandable,
given that Canada is a liberal democracy. But liberal values and principles are so
pervasive and all-encompassing they often escape attention:6 descriptive theorists
fail to acknowledge that the law they aim to describe promotes liberal ideals and
principles, and prescriptive theorists, by and large, begin with a liberal stance,
calling the law into question on the basis of its fit with their particular
articulation of liberalism.
Concepts of rights, freedom and autonomy are so all-pervasive it can be said
that the political morality of liberalism supplies the language of everyday legal
discourse. Furthermore, the pervasiveness of liberalism excuses (at least partly)
the presumptions of most prescriptive theorists, for they want to be active in the
dominant discussion. Engaged as they are with their fellow liberal-thinkers,
6.

John Gray, Endgames: Questions in Late Modern Thought (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997) at
51[hereinafter Endgames].
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living in a society structured by liberal thought, they may give little notice to the
fact they are enveloped in a particular culture, one adrift in a sea of alternative
cultures.7 This is clearly illustrated in the current debate between liberals and
communitarians, as some have noted that this debate may be defused and tamed
through efforts at bringing communitarian insights into liberal theorizing, efforts
we see, for example, in the more recent work of John Rawls and Will Kymlicka.8
Communitarians, far from being “deep critics” of liberalism, are committed to
essentially the same values and principles upon which rest liberal theory, which
makes the process of resolving the “conflict” between the two camps a matter of
working out how the self is situated in and related to a community and culture. It
should be acknowledged, however, that being immersed in a sea of liberal
thought does not by itself account for the way in which theorists work within the
liberal paradigm, for the pervasiveness of liberal thought in modern Western
societies is enhanced by the fact that theorists seem either convinced of the truth
of liberal theory or resigned to its power.9 Either way they may find it
unproductive to criticize the law from any standpoint other than liberal theory.
7.

8.

9.

The term “culture” is inordinately elastic, capable of capturing a wide variety of notions and
describing a wide variety of activities and objects in the world. In this work I propose a middle path,
tying this term down to collectivities formed through shared structures acting to connect people into
self-described and self-defined groups both physically and by providing meaning and purpose to the
collectives pulled together. This captures both “ethnic” cultures, formed through shared language,
traditions and beliefs (the shared structures), and “political” cultures, formed through shared visions
of the good life, embodied in social, economic and political institutions. I will speak, then, of the
liberal culture (one which could be generalized across nations, or restricted within Canada’s borders)
and the cultures of Aboriginal peoples (themselves capable of identification on political grounds, but
also “ethnically”).
Ronald Beiner makes this point in “What’s the Matter With Liberalism?” in A. Hutchinson and L.
Green, eds., Law and Community: The End of Individualism? (Toronto: Carswell, 1989) [hereinafter
Law and Community] at 38-41 [hereinafter “What’s The Matter With Liberalism?”]. He notes that
the recent Rawls (in, for example, “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory: The Dewey Lectures”
(1980) 77 J. of Phil. 519 [hereinafter “Kantian Constructivism”]) and Amy Gutmann (in
“Communitarian Critics of Liberalism” (1985) 14 Phil. and Public Affairs 308) have both simply
capitulated one of the main points of communitarianism, that “liberal ideals are historically
generated, the product of a particular, specifically modern culture and of a shared liberal tradition.”
Furthermore, on the charge of “atomism,” that liberalism is grounded in an overly simplistic and
erroneous notion of the individual self, liberals can (a) reply that many classical liberals (e.g. John
Stuart Mill) never held such a view and (b) explicitly incorporate into liberal theory a notion of the
self as constituted by community values and beliefs, while preserving the notion that the self
nevertheless must be free to question these values and even to reject them if that is deemed
reasonable. In that regard Will Kymlicka’s Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon,
1989) [hereinafter Liberalism, Community and Culture] is illustrative.
Will Kymlicka is both taken with liberal theory and asks that those interested in developing defenses
for cultural rights resign themselves to doing so within liberal theory, as to do otherwise would be
wasteful, given liberalism’s entanglement with the law:
For better or worse, it is predominantly non-[A]boriginal judges and politicians who have
the ultimate power to protect and enforce [A]boriginal rights, and so it is important to
find a justification of them that such people can recognize and understand ... Aboriginal
rights ... will only be secure when they are viewed, not as competing with liberalism, but
as an essential component of liberal political practice.
Liberalism, Community and Culture, ibid. at 154. It is difficult to say whether Kymlicka fails to fully
appreciate the exercise of power this thinly veils, or whether he appreciates the threatening nature of
this position, but is resigned to its inevitability.
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While liberal values and principles underlie the law, so one can speak of
liberal theory informing the law and its development, liberal theory proper is a
separate matter. Liberal theorists each articulate particular visions of the
grounding of liberal values and principles, and no one articulation captures the
theoretical construct that is the law as liberalism incarnate. Thus, we need to
attempt a broad overview of liberal theory to (a) capture a sense of threads that
run through recent articulations of liberal theory, (b) indicate where there are
separate streams of liberal thought germane to the study of Aboriginal
perceptions of the law and (c) say a few words about tensions and problems that
arise in contemporary articulations of liberal theory.
Liberal theory rests on a number of fundamental premises about human
nature. Will Kymlicka begins by noting that liberals advance the claim that we
all have an essential interest in living a good life.10 This is not to say that our
collective aim should be to strive to identify “the good,” some entity possessed
of value, the promotion of which would be the guiding principle for social and
political engineers.11 The good life must be pursued individually, as we each
strive to better ourselves according to our own sense of what is valuable.
Furthermore, while we each search for a good way of living, this does not license
others to impose their beliefs upon us, however much they may sincerely believe
they know what the good life entails. Our search for the good life is personal
(and to some degree subjective), and this demands that we be free from outside
coercion or interference. As Kymlicka notes, our lives are “lived from the
inside,”12 with meaning in life derived from freely embracing the form of life we
have each personally discovered and which we each separately believe to be the
best we can live. This means the imposition of forms of life by external sources
is not only a mistaken approach to discovering and inculcating the good life, but
that it would also undermine whatever essential meaning the form of life
imposed may have promised. Society must be structured, then, to facilitate our
individual endeavours to discover and live by good ways of living.
At least two arguments support this liberal approach to the place of value in
individual and social contexts, and to the structuring of society. First, there may
be concern with our ability to satisfactorily identify a single “societal good.”
Second, there may be concern about what is called for under the notion of respect
for the individual. While the two may together offer reasons for privileging the
individual, the second must be the more fundamental.
Would the single societal good be the maximization of happiness, the
promotion of virtue, the creation of conditions wherein those with special
abilities might flourish, the instantiation of majority-determined principles of
10. Ibid. at 10.
11. Michael Sandel contrasts teleological and deontological visions of political morality, with
utilitarianism as an example of a theory which posits a telos guiding decisions and behaviour (the
maximization of general happiness), and Kantian liberalism as an example of a theory which
prioritizes the right over the good, grounding both notions of the right and right action independent
of any conception of the good. See Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1983) at 2-7 [hereinafter Liberalism and the Limits of Justice].
12. Liberalism, Community and Culture, supra note 8 at 12.
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equality and fairness, or some combination of these sorts of potential social
ends? Concern may be with the difficulty in coming up with adequate criteria for
identifying what the one “true end” of society might be, or with the possibility
that there may not be one identifiable good, but many, possibly radically
conflicting, conceptions of the good.13 Undoubtedly, uncertainty about the
identification of a societal good fuels the attractiveness of liberal theory.
Yet by itself this uncertainty is insufficient to ground the liberal thesis that
the good life must be pursued by and through the individual. On the one hand,
our inability to identify “the good” might entail that our project be to continue
searching for this elusive society-structuring end, all the while using our
currently best-supported vision to structure society.14 Furthermore, if there are
radically incommensurable conceptions of the good, one might argue, perhaps on
pragmatist grounds, for adoption of that of dominant society.15 Alternatively one
could argue for the protection of the inheritances of liberalism—conceptions of
liberty and equality—as these function to allow for a civil society in which the
value of pluralism can be accommodated.16 Here the liberal theorist must argue
that, whether or not knowledge of (or reasonably well-grounded beliefs about) a
“societal good” were available, the process of constructing society on its basis
would be disrespectful of the individual, that moral being possessed of value in
the world. This, then, would be the stronger liberal argument in support of
locating value in the individual, and the individual’s faculty of judgment. Society
must not be built around principles centred on grand notions of the good (for
example, around the principle that happiness must be maximized), for to do so
would be in principle disrespectful of the individual.17
Two related arguments lend further support. First, it must be recognized and
appreciated that lives are “lived from the inside,”18 as individuals both experience
the world and—through their creative force, their self-legislating capacity—
create the world of value in which they live. The imposition of social forms on
13. In Endgames, supra note 6 at 52, John Gray argues that:
Rawls [in A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), but more
particularly in Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993)] grasps
an insight of profound importance when he argues that ... our society harbors conceptions
of the good that are not merely incompatible but also rationally incommensurable: there is
no overarching standard in terms of which their conflicting claims can be arbitrated.
14. Margaret Moore notes that we make decisions in private matters with doubt concerning the truth of
our beliefs (for example, she notes we make decisions about marriage in light of doubts about the
ability of relationships to survive in the long term), and wonders why doubt about whether our
beliefs concerning the good life are “true” should prevent us from making public or political
decisions on their basis. See M. Moore, Foundations of Liberalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993)
at 150-151 [hereinafter Foundations of Liberalism].
15. See, for example, Richard Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1982) and Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1989).
16. See John Gray, “What is Dead and What is Living in Liberalism?” in Post-Liberalism: Studies in
Political Thought (New York: Routledge, 1993) [hereinafter Post-Liberalism].
17. Clearly there would be practical concerns: a utilitarian society could demand, for example, sacrifice
of the interests of some to further the happiness of others. The challenge to those who prioritize the
good over the right runs deeper than this.
18. Liberalism, Community and Culture, supra note 8 at 12-13.
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individuals channelling their lives into particular paths, inhibits their ability to be
individual moral beings, to be free in their pursuit of what they believe to be the
good life and to freely choose how to live on the basis of the values they
currently hold dear.19 This upholds the principle of liberty. Second, to potentially
treat people as means to some end (as achieving success in pursuit of a societal
good may require that some individuals be used to further this pursuit) is to
ignore the separateness and distinctiveness of individuals. This upholds the
principle of equality, as each person must be treated as an end. Together these
principles demand that society must be structured around equal protection of the
liberty of each individual.
Liberal theorists need not focus on the nature of “the good,” and instead
concentrate on the need to foster individual freedom to pursue individual visions
of the good life. Individual freedom is demanded given both our shared interest
in living good lives and our need to be unencumbered by unnecessary outside
forces constraining our efforts. With this approach, liberal theorists eschew
nihilist or fatalist conclusions some might imagine follow skeptical claims about
“the good.”20 Liberal theorists can acknowledge a degree of skepticism about our
knowledge-claims concerning the ultimate nature of a societal good and even
acknowledge that on an individual level we may never be certain that the life we
are currently living is the best available, yet avoid a pessimistic outlook by
maintaining that there is such a thing as the individual good life and proposing
that one of our fundamental aims must be to continually search for the good for
ourselves.21 This, then, would serve as the guiding architectural principle for
liberal societies—which should be designed so as to assist each of us in our
individual quests to live good lives.
Here we must distinguish two paths liberal theorists might take, arguing that
one is not in harmony with the deeper philosophical vision to which the liberal
adheres. We just noted the liberal theorist holds we each search for the good life,
and that liberal society should be constructed to further this individualized
project. We need to ask why, though, the search is necessary and what it is about
the search that is valuable.
The search may be thought to be necessary because we acknowledge the
fallibility or general inadequacy of our individual faculties, forcing us to face the
fact we may be wrong about what we currently believe the good life to entail.22
Given that we accept the possibility of error in current beliefs and given that we
believe there is such a thing as the right way to live, we must continually
On the subject as the ground for all maxims of action see I. Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of
Morals, trans. H. J. Paton (New York: Harper & Row, 1964) [hereinafter Metaphysics of Morals]; on
the attempt to ground a theory of justice in a Kantian model “without the metaphysics” see Rawls, A
Theory of Justice, supra note 13; for a critique of such an attempt see Liberalism and the Limits of
Justice, supra note 11.
20. This is one reason contemporary liberal theorists have taken this tack, as earlier critics attacked what
they took to be a skeptical premise within liberal theory. See, for example, Alison Jaggar, Feminist
Politics and Human Nature (Totowa: Rowman & Allenheld, 1983).
21. M. Moore argues that far from being able to maintain its claim to “justificatory neutrality,” modern
liberal theory readmits an ideal of the good: Foundations of Liberalism, supra note 14.
22. Liberalism, Community and Culture, supra note 8 at 10-12.
19.
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endeavour to search for better ways of living. This search requires that we be
constantly willing to subject our current beliefs to scrutiny, questioning the
validity of our claims to knowledge about both the good and the good life we
wish to pursue. It also requires that we be willing and able to revise our current
beliefs if we find them ill-founded or seriously suspect they may be mistaken.
The search may also be thought to be necessary, however, as itself an
expression of an individual will. What we search for may be in a sense irrelevant.
Some might suggest there is no thing “out there” that is the good life, but rather
that the entire story is just that of the will inventing values and living through
them. Attention is centred on the capacity to choose, not what is chosen; ultimate
value is accorded to nothing but the will and its exercise in creating the world of
value which we then inhabit (some may continue to say we “choose” our values,
though this term loses some of its common meaning under this position).23
Recall we noted above that contemporary liberal theorists maintain there is
such a thing as the good life, that thing we all have an essential interest in living.
Concentrating attention on the will threatens to undermine the sense of this
notion. One of the challenges posed by grounding liberal theory in respect for the
individual has been in finding a theory of the self that upholds placing such value
in the individual while simultaneously having the autonomous self direct its
energies towards goodness in the world.24 Kant’s vision of the self as an
independent entity, capable of universal legislation—in essence a sovereign lawmaking body unto itself—is best-suited to the task of locating ultimate value in
the individual self, but central to this vision is the location of the essence of
personhood in a transcendent realm, the noumenal world.25 Only a self removed
from the phenomenal and empirical world would have the capacity to be selflegislating, for this capacity requires that the self be capable of initiating causal
chains and of being truly responsible for its own actions. If the self were
postulated to be wholly phenomenal, it is difficult to see how it could be truly
autonomous, capable of legislating action, of acting as a sovereign entity unto
itself. This transcendental self, however, is ex hypothesi distanced from the
phenomenal world, its self-legislating capacity grounded in another realm of
being. How does one argue, then, that this transcendentally-grounded entity
should have as its concerns phenomenally-situated “goods” and “good lives”?
The liberal theorist is forced to decide how to proceed. Does he worry about the
need to ground the theory in a vision of the self capable of upholding the ultimate
value put on the self, a need which drives one to postulate a self removed from
23.

Rawls occasionally uses language which suggests this picture, as when he says the identity of the self
is independent of any ends or desires: see “Kantian Constructivism”, supra note 8 at 544, discussed
in Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, supra note 11 at 62-63.
24. Margaret Moore describes this as working out how the essentially formal notion of the autonomous
self can be wed to the need for substantive moral content in the decisions and judgments reached by
the self (Foundations of Liberalism, supra note 14 at 50, 156-158). This problem was noted long ago
in relation to Kant’s ethics, and plays a central role in contemporary critiques of Kantian liberalism.
See, for example, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, ibid. and Bernard Williams, Ethics and the
Limits of Philosophy (London: Fontana, 1985).
25. Metaphysics of Morals, supra note 19.
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the world of experience and goods, a being for whom concern about the world is
hard to generate? Or does he worry about the need to ensure that individuals are
concerned to search for things with value in the world, such that the self acts
autonomously (where acting autonomously is left a mystery26) but with direction?
Contemporary liberal theorists distance themselves from transcendental
notions, avoiding an approach which grounds the self in a noumenal realm.
Besides a basic aversion to transcendental philosophy, there are a number of
reasons why liberal theorists avoid grounding their positions in nothing but the
independent and sovereign will. First, this avoids threats of egoism and
arbitrariness such grounding would invite. If value were to lie exclusively in the
capacity to exercise the will, that which is chosen would be that which is chosen,
nothing more. That which is chosen would have no inherent value, and we would
be either misusing language or misleading ourselves to say we were “searching
for” or “choosing” it. Furthermore, the liberal rejects the prioritization of will
over reason. Liberal theory adheres to a vision of the reasoned quest for the good
life, the choosing of ends and projects on the basis of a reasoned examination of
one’s self and the beliefs one currently holds. Focusing attention exclusively on
the sovereign will threatens to undercut this vision of reason guiding the will and
encourages us to venerate will over reason. The liberal does not imagine we go
beyond good and evil, creating the good life, but that we are on a quest to
discover the good life, using our “light of reason” in this task. Finally, the liberal
engineering project only makes sense if there are individualized good ways of
living for which individual searches are carried out. The sense of the liberal
project rests on allegiance to the place of reason in discovering value, for if the
search were about nothing more than the act of choosing, where that which is
chosen is not chosen for our estimation of its goodness, society would not need
to be structured so as to facilitate an open-ended search for the good life. One
could as easily (or more easily) engineer society so that a suitably expansive but
26.

For example, communitarians challenge the liberal conception of the self (as capable of stepping
back from values, beliefs and ends) by arguing that such a conception of the self is both one not
accessed through self-awareness, and one inconsistent with the notion of the embedded self, that
notion best supported by reason and experience. Kymlicka responds to this challenge by arguing that
the self need not be able to actually remove itself from values, beliefs and ends, but just be capable
of reflecting on these, such that it can then choose to modify, or even deny, these if deemed
unreasonable [Liberalism, Community and Culture, supra note 8, at 15-17]. This ignores, however,
the argument Sandel lays out in the first section of his text, that the concept of the autonomous self
employed by the liberal (for example, the “thin” concept used by Rawls) is still subject to the charge
that it is Kantian in that it posits a self which must be in some deeply meaningful sense be “free”
[Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, supra note 11 at 2-7 and 47-65]. One will look in vain in
Kymlicka’s work for a defense of the sort of self-reflective and essentially free being he posits as the
self. While this may reflect Kymlicka’s attachment to a Millian form of liberalism, as Sandel notes, it
ignores the need to ground liberalism’s claim to neutrality in a deontological ethics because,
[o]n the full deontological view, the primacy of justice describes not only a moral priority
but also a privileged form of justification; the right is prior to the good not only in that its
claims take precedence, but also in that its principles are independently derived. This
means that, unlike other practical injunctions, principles of justice are justified in a way
that does not depend on any particular vision of the good.
Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, ibid. at 2.
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finite number of options for ways of living were available (where what these
options were would be unimportant), so that individuals would have the
opportunity to choose how they might live. Complaints about the lack of “real”
options would not make sense, as there would be no sense to the notion of better
or worse ways of living, and so no sense to the notion that individuals were not
being offered real choice. An individual who claimed she wanted the opportunity
to do something beyond the choices offered would be asked what value she saw
in this: did she think there was some value in the opportunities she wished to
have open? To have open “real” opportunities, to have “real” choice, implies that
opportunities are being offered which would be reasonably preferred over others,
which are likely better for at least some individuals.
While liberal theorists acknowledge the need to posit an autonomous self
searching for things with value in the world, they have trouble (a) providing a
non-transcendental notion of the self up to the task of explaining why the self is
the source of value and (b) resolving the tension between the concept of the
autonomous self and the need to locate a source for motivation sufficient to drive
it towards the project of searching for good ways of living in the world. This
tension is exacerbated by the link between liberal theory and the liberal project.
Liberal theory is meant to uphold the liberal project of social engineering, of
constructing society so as to maximize freedoms necessary to our individual
searches for good ways of living. While the liberal theorist wants to tie the
autonomous self down to the search for good ways of living, the engineering
project places minimal limits on what the individual may elect to pursue,27 as
placing external limits on freedom would be to disrespect the individual. Liberal
avoidance of arbitrariness and relativism boils down, then, to a wish, a hope that
individuals will use their reasoning capacities to see the good in certain ways of
living. As the basic blueprint for society is the creation of a context of choice,
control over individual choice must be avoided. With minimal external
constraints on how each individual may choose to live his or her own life, the
door is open to irresponsible action. Liberal theorists would seem, however, to
accept this outcome, as the price society must pay to respect the individual.
This overview of liberal theory concludes with a brief look into how
liberalism plays out into the liberal project hinted at above. It is in this movement
from theory to practice that the law plays a crucial role, as theories about the
right and the good, and about the self, the community and state come together
into a vision of how the law aids in the construction of the liberal state.

Law and the Liberal Project
Liberal theory rests on a vision of the autonomous self engaged in the project of
searching for the good way to live, for otherwise liberal theory invites relativism
and arbitrariness and its project fails to make sense. Liberal theory grounded in
27.

As individuals will inevitably pursue projects which conflict with the projects of others, some
principle of “harm” regulating individual action will be necessary.
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principles about human nature leads to a vision of the role of the state in meeting
our “essential interests.” The state must recognize the freedoms necessary for our
moral enterprise, ensuring that we are all free to constantly re-evaluate our
beliefs and values, free to cast aside beliefs and values we find wanting, and free
to remake ourselves in light of new beliefs and values we now find personally
meaningful. In the interests of discovering which values and beliefs might be
questionable, and which valuable, the state should ensure that each is free to
espouse her views on the matter, so we can all learn from the ensuing dialogue
on the nature of the good life. We should all be free, as well, from unwanted
attempts to coerce us into believing or valuing certain ends or projects—others
may attempt to educate us, but ultimately we must be free to make up our own
minds.28
The law functions to ensure that these freedoms are respected and protected,
that each individual is recognized as a locus of meaning, worthy of equal respect
and protection in the pursuit of the good life. For those individuals who
unreasonably interfere with others in their pursuit of the good life, the law must
step in to provide redress (and perhaps to attempt to deter such behavior). In
cases in which several distinct legitimate efforts at pursuing projects deemed
valuable and meaningful contest over resources required to advance these
pursuits, the law may be called upon to weigh the individual interests, allocating
resources between the contestants as fairly as can be accomplished.29 This
balancing may not be simply aggregative, as the interests may be deemed to hold
varying degrees of import.30
This illustrates how the law may act as an institution to promote particular
values.31 The values are those “at the bottom,” the essential interests we all have
in living the good life and so on. More particularized values are promoted not
through particular legal enactments, but through the law maintaining a social
structure which facilitates the pursuit of these particularized interests by
individuals. By and large, liberal values and principles animate the law by
providing the theoretical underpinning guiding its development and giving it
meaning and purpose.
Inevitably there will be problems in implementing a liberalized legal
structure in a democratic context. While essential interests and fundamental
28.

The process of education can be a troublesome matter for liberal theorists. They would likely prefer
moral education be a matter of choice, and be restricted in application to mature and rational
individuals, those not easily susceptible to coercion or subtle manipulation. The problem of
education is explored in a later section.
29. In a liberal democracy in the first instance this would be a task of the state. The law may be called in
to resolve disputes over this allocation.
30. In “Can Collective and Individual Rights Coexist?” (1998) 22 Melbourne University L. Rev. 310
[hereinafter “Collective and Individual Rights”], Leighton McDonald addresses concerns over the
interaction of collective and individual rights, as some argue that collective rights may override or
undermine individual rights. McDonald notes, however, that between rights of any sort there will be
conflicts, and these are resolved by considering the intrinsic worth or value of the interests the rights
are intended to protect.
31. It must be born in mind that a divide of unknown dimensions separates law as an attempt to
crystallize liberal theory in practice and liberal theory itself.
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principles can guide the design of the law, there will be difficulties in
accommodating all the interests society may find worthy of protection. For
example, society may find it worthwhile to afford protection to minority
populations, to allow them to flourish culturally and socially. A legal system
animated by liberal theory may struggle, however, to find a coherent and
plausible basis on which to afford protection to the interests of collections of
individuals, especially when these may conflict with both the interests of
individuals outside the collective and the interests of individuals within the
collective.32
Two fundamental tenets of liberalism are respect for the autonomy of the
individual and the principle of equality. Unlike less sophisticated forms of
utilitarianism, which may be willing to authorize the sacrifice of the well-being
of a few to further the interests of the many, liberal theory rests on deep respect
for the individual. The individual is conceptualized as the locus of moral worth, a
being in whom value inheres, a fundamental source of value and meaning in
lives lived.33 To sacrifice an individual in the name of some abstract notion as
“the greater good” is seen as misguided. Furthermore, each individual demands
respect simply by virtue of being an individual moral agent, which requires that
each be accorded equal stature. Liberal theory cannot countenance, then,
differential valuing between individuals, such that one (or a few) may be
sacrificed for the good of the many, or such that the interests of the many may be
sacrificed for the few.34
Imagine, for example, measures to protect a minority cultural community
from the disadvantage inherent in their immersion in larger political
communities. One measure might be to introduce citizenship and voting rights in
the minority community in such a way as to maintain local community control
reposed in the hands of the cultural group.35 Other local people not members of
the cultural community would be restricted from full membership in the local
governance structures, and to some degree prevented from engaging fully in
local political power. How could liberal theory, manifest in the law, endorse such
measures?
Would this not be to sacrifice the rights of the non-members, as individuals,
to the interests of a community? Is this not to disrespect the individual in the
interests of a collective? Would this not introduce an unreasonable measure of
inequality into society? What if, further, the local cultural community were to
32. “Collective and Individual Rights”, supra note 30.
33. To speak of the moral agent as the source of value and meaning must be taken to mean, again, that
while the individual searches for better ways to live (and does not create value in itself), it is in freely
choosing good ways of living that value in living is generated.
34. Interests may be differentially valued, such that one person’s interest in free expression may be
weighed more heavily than another’s interest in preventing picketing outside her store, but liberalism
will not allow that the store-owner herself be treated as worth less than the picketer.
35. Such measures could be achieved through simple local governance, if the local population were
sufficiently of the minority cultural group, or by restricting citizenship and voting rights in relation to
certain powers and institutions to members of the minority cultural group, if there are large numbers
of non-members in the local population. As the latter presents clearer problems for liberalism, we
will focus on these sorts of situations and measures.
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decide to regulate its local education regime, forcing monolingual education up
to the high school level in the language of this cultural community? As much as
this might anger local residents who are non-members of the cultural community,
would this not also limit the possibilities of choice for members of the
community who might question the value of living in the greater political
community with children whose first tongue would not be that of dominant
society?
Liberal theorists can approach these sorts of problems in several ways. First,
they may deny that there are such collective rights—rights which the law would
have been enjoined to protect. Absent such rights, minority cultures would have
to find other means to protect these sorts of interests. Second, liberal theorists
may argue that more sophisticated and nuanced articulations of liberal theory
support the existence of collective rights of this nature. The problem then would
be merely one of coordination, working out how collective and individual rights
can best be mutually accommodated in a multi-cultural society. Third, liberal
theorists may acknowledge that from within their vision of the right and the good
there are no means by which to support the notion of such state-sanctioned
collective rights, but agree that a pluralist foundation for the law may
acknowledge the legitimacy of such rights. That is, society may be seen as
capable of supporting a legal regime built on a pluralist moral foundation, with
some mechanism for resolving disputes that might arise between competing
moral visions of the good and the right. As we turn to how Aboriginal peoples’
relationship to the law has been conceptualized and institutionalized we will have
an opportunity to see which of these responses the domestic legal system has
embraced.

III

ABORIGINAL COMMUNITIES AND THE LAW

The Constitutionalization of Aboriginal Rights: Resource Rights
After the constitutionalization of Aboriginal and treaty rights in 1982, the law’s
relationship to Canada’s Aboriginal peoples went through a transformation.36
Aboriginal and treaty rights that had not been extinguished prior to 1982 came to
be “recognized and affirmed” in the Constitution. Over the past 20 years

36.

Section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982,
c. 11. states that:
The existing Aboriginal and Treaty rights of Canada’s Aboriginal Peoples are hereby
recognized and affirmed.
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considerable jurisprudence has built up over the definition of, and protection
accorded to, such rights.37
Aboriginal rights are acknowledged to be “rights,” but categorized as
unique, of a nature that they “cannot ... be defined on the basis of the
philosophical precepts of the liberal enlightenment.”38 For example, they are not
rights held in virtue of the holder being a rational agent, deserving of respect,
rights universal in their application to individual humans. Aboriginal rights are
firmly grounded as Aboriginal rights, meant to provide protection for the
“Aboriginality” of Aboriginal communities,39 those elements that predate the
arrival of Europeans and the influence of their culture.
Much of the litigation over Aboriginal and treaty rights has involved
traditional practices such as hunting and fishing, as Aboriginal peoples have
challenged government regulation of activities claimed to be integral to
Aboriginal culture. The test for defining what counts as an Aboriginal right
focuses on the notion of elements of culture, and Aboriginal peoples have to
demonstrate that the activity they wish to protect was, before European contact,
an integral part of their distinctive culture, a practice that goes to the heart of
their cultural identity.40
With these sorts of claimed rights, the tension between collective rights and
individual interests is not readily apparent. First, the right itself, while described
as collective, is individualizable—while the right is held by communities, it is
exercised by individual members of the community.41 Such rights can be
contrasted to other collective rights, such as language rights, held by the group

37. R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 [hereinafter Sparrow], explored the meaning of the expressions
“existing” and “recognized and affirmed,” and set out a test for determining when legislative
infringement of Aboriginal rights would be justifiable. R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507
[hereinafter Van der Peet], set out tests for defining and establishing Aboriginal rights, and
established a framework for understanding the nature of Aboriginal and treaty rights based on the
notion that the purpose of section 35 was to facilitate the reconciliation of the prior presence of
Aboriginal peoples to the sovereignty of the Crown. R. v. Badger, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 771 [hereinafter
Badger], held that the Sparrow test for legislative infringement could be applied to treaty rights,
while R. v. Adams, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101 [hereinafter Adams], established the nature of the
relationship between Aboriginal rights and Aboriginal title. Aboriginal title was defined in
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 [hereinafter Delgamuukw].
38. Van der Peet, ibid. at para. 19.
39. Ibid. at paras. 19-20.
40. Ibid. at paras. 44-74.
41. In “Collective and Individual Rights”, supra note 30, McDonald argues that hunting and fishing
rights are collective in that they are not individualizable. To make this claim, however, he
conceptualizes such rights as integrally tied to the culture of the people exercising them, such that the
very meaning of the practice is derived from the cultural aspect of practice. While this
conceptualization would make such rights truly “collective,” it is not a conceptualization under
which the Supreme Court of Canada operates. Key to such an articulation of collective rights is the
significance of the practice to the people for whom it is culturally significant—the Supreme Court,
however, does not define an Aboriginal right in terms of the significance of the practice to the people
in question. This was an approach advocated in dissent in Van der Peet, ibid., but not adopted by the
Court. The Court only examines the import of the activity to the people when determining the
existence of the right, not when it turns to defining the nature of the right.
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and only exercisable collectively.42 Second, as the Supreme Court has defined
Aboriginal rights, the right to hunt or fish attaches to an activity, not the
autonomy of the community whose culture grounds the activity, and exercising
the right does not directly threaten the ability of non-Aboriginals to exercise their
ability to choose to engage in projects they deem valuable. If the right were to
centre on the ability of the collective to decide how the resource in question were
to be used, it might manifest into management regimes unreasonably interfering
with the pursuit of the good life by other individuals (or collections of
individuals) in society.
An Aboriginal right of this nature, what we can term an Aboriginal resource
right, is essentially corrective in nature, directed towards what the law has
acknowledged to be the disadvantageous position of Aboriginal peoples. Over
the past few centuries the Crown gradually assumed control over the allocation
and management of resources. As Aboriginal peoples had previously enjoyed the
use and benefit of resources in Canada, in doing so, the Crown placed itself in a
fiduciary position vis-à-vis Aboriginal peoples, a fiduciary relationship
recognized in post-Constitutionalization jurisprudence.43 In this fiduciary
position, the Crown falls under a general duty to act in the best interests of those
whose interests have been taken up. Insofar as the Crown has not done so, it is
now enjoined to put Aboriginal peoples into a position which respects the fact
that they existed in Canada prior to the arrival of Europeans. In continuing to
control the allocation and management of resources, the Crown must continue to
act in the best interests of Aboriginal peoples, who have some legal claim to the
use of these resources.
Only if the claimed Aboriginal right makes excessive demands on the
resources being used could tension arise between these “collective rights” and
the rights of others. In such situations one might argue, from a liberal vantagepoint, that the protection of these minority rights would unfairly interfere with
the ability of others in the larger society to attempt to pursue their projects. In
such circumstances, as when, for example, the right is found to be exclusive in
nature, thereby potentially limiting others in their enjoyment of the use of the
resource, the Supreme Court has found that the Crown may limit the collective
right in the interest of protecting the rights of others with valid claims to the
resource in question.44
Such situations are likely to be quite rare. It is not just that there are few
situations in which Aboriginal peoples could demonstrate that, prior to contact
with Europeans, they engaged in practices integral to their cultural identity which
today could be characterized in such a way as to potentially exclude nonAboriginals from freely pursuing their interests in the resources being used. In
42.

Denise Reaume, “Official-Language Rights: Intrinsic Value and the Protection of Difference” in W.
Kymlicka and W. Norman, eds., Citizenship in Diverse Societies (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2000) 245.
43. Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335; Sparrow, supra note 37; Van der Peet, supra note 37; R.
v. Gladstone, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723 [hereinafter Gladstone]; and Delgamuukw, supra note 37.
44. Gladstone, ibid. at paras. 62-64.
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relation to Aboriginal resource rights what primarily minimizes tension between
collective Aboriginal rights and the individualized rights of non-Aboriginals is
the remarkably thin conception of culture the Supreme Court has deployed.
While the Court has spoken as if it were attempting to protect “Aboriginality”—
the core of Aboriginal identity—by defining culture in terms of pre-contact
activities and customs the law has effectively isolated culture from identity.

Culture, Identity and Governance Rights
The Supreme Court has decided that at particular moments in time, moments just
prior to contact with Europeans,45 the many varied communities of people in
Canada were engaged in certain activities which the Court claims “define” the
nature of these “traditional” peoples. To protect this identity, the Court
maintains, the continued practice of these activities must be protected. This is far
removed, however, from considerations about the identities of the peoples in
question.46
There are two general problems with this approach. First, distancing
contemporary Aboriginal peoples from their “true” identities, fixed at a distant
point in the past, removes what the Court fixes as the “cultures” of Aboriginal
peoples from their contemporary identities. Second, and more importantly, even
were we to accept that the “true” culture of an Aboriginal people is found at that
point in time moments before contact with Europeans, Aboriginal peoples
engaged in the sorts of activities they did, in the ways they did, for reasons.
These reasons, and not the activities, would have formed the core of their cultural
identities (and ex hypothesi, would form the core of their “traditional” identities
today). An Aboriginal people—as with any cultural community— should be
defined not on the basis of their having hunted at night with torches, or fished
with particular sorts of nets and hooked spears, but on the basis that they carried
out these activities at certain times and in certain ways because they believed and
felt certain things. If the law were interested in protecting Aboriginality, it would
be interested in aiding Aboriginal people in protecting their ability to continue to
believe and feel as they have for generations, all the while recognizing that it is
unacceptable to simply equate contemporary identities with past cultural
practices.
As it is, Aboriginal rights are tied to a shadow of cultural identity, and then
“protected” in such a way as to minimize friction between these rights and the
45. There are many such moments, as peoples across Canada first encountered Europeans at different
times.
46. R. Barsh and J. Youngblood Henderson, “The Supreme Court’s Van der Peet trilogy: Naive
Imperialism and Ropes of Sand” (1997) 42 McGill L.J. 993; John Borrows, “Frozen Rights in
Canada: Constitutional Interpretation and the Trickster” (1998) 22 Am. Indian L. Rev. 37; John
Borrows and Leonard Rotman, “The Sui Generis Nature of Aboriginal Rights: Does It Make a
Difference?” (1997) 36 Alta. L. Rev. 9.
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interests of non-Aboriginal individuals in society. Or at least that is how things
have developed, by and large, to this point. The language of the test for
Aboriginal rights is fairly general and there is certainly room to include in the
expressions “activities,” “practices” and “customs,” elements of Aboriginal
cultures that do go more directly to their core identities—those forms of identity
which underlie transformation over time. For example, Aboriginal peoples would
have had at the time of contact with Europeans customs related to control of their
community membership. They would have had ways in which they defined
themselves, such that they could identify members and non-members of their
communities.
Today these sorts of customs could translate into claims for Aboriginal rights
to control over citizenship and citizenship’s attendant rights. These would be
included in a potentially broad category of Aboriginal rights, “Aboriginal
governance rights.” While the judiciary has yet to deal extensively with claims to
such rights, they have been translated into rights contained in modern treaties,
the product of prolonged and exhausting negotiations between the Crown and a
few Aboriginal peoples.47
The potential tension between Aboriginal governance rights and the rights of
individuals should be more readily apparent. The hypothetical scenario
introduced earlier was built around the possibility of just such rights, as we noted
that a minority community could use power over citizenship and voting to
restrict the ability of both non-community and community members to pursue
their individual interests. Devolving a measure of political control to a local
cultural community could lead to local “non-liberal” regimes, local societies
established so as to prioritize the interests of the community over those of
resident individuals, both members and non-members of the community alike. It
is not just that in particular instances the interests of the community could be
held above those of the individual,48 but that society might be structured so as to
promote a societal good and not the rights of individuals.
While control over citizenship is one element necessary for the creation of
potentially non-liberal regimes, the membership of the community must also
have the power to make decisions about such matters as resource allocation,
education, service provision and the like. Again, the judiciary has yet to deal
extensively with rights to the control of such matters, which would fall under the
umbrella of Aboriginal governance rights.
However, the Supreme Court has begun to deal with one form of Aboriginal
right which will clearly present difficulties for liberal theory. Aboriginal title lies
47.

48.

See, for example, chapter 2 of Canada, British Columbia and Nisga’a Nation, Nisga’a Final
Agreement (Victoria: Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs, 1998), online: <http://www.gov.bc.ca/tno
/negotiation/nisgaa/docs/GENERALPROVISIONS.htm>. It would be more accurate to say
“something like such rights” has been translated into powers contained in this agreement, as a
citizenship regime established under this agreement is subject to the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms. This goes to illustrate the thesis developed in the next section of this paper.
This can be so in liberal societies, as when limits are placed on the exercise of some person’s
individual rights in the interests of, for example, the safety of others, as when one is prohibited from
yelling “fire” in a crowded theatre.
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on one end of the spectrum of Aboriginal rights.49 At one end are those rights
which are not connected in any way to land—for example, the exercise of a right
to speak an Aboriginal language is in no way linked to any considerations about
land. In the middle of the spectrum are those Aboriginal rights which must be
carried out over some tract of land, but which are not tied to any particular piece
of land. For example, an Aboriginal people may have a right to hunt over a large
territory, but not have the right to hunt over any particular area within this
territory, and may have no ownership claims to much of the lands over which
they can hunt. Finally, at the far end of this spectrum rests Aboriginal title, a
right to land, a right to the exclusive use and occupation of lands traditionally
held by Aboriginal peoples.
The protection of Aboriginal title could interfere with the ability of nonAboriginals to use title-lands to pursue their projects. Furthermore, Aboriginal
title includes the right to decide the uses to which title-lands are put, a right
exercised by the community.50 Aboriginal title-holders have, then, the right to
determine uses to which their lands are put, a power of self-governance which
could lead to decisions adversely affecting the ability of Aboriginal and nonAboriginal individuals alike to pursue projects they deem valuable and
worthwhile. Furthermore, it is not just that these decisions could limit the ability
of some particular individuals to pursue some individual projects—the
Aboriginal title-holder, the Aboriginal community, may make decisions which
put in place a structure restricting individual choice in general. Aboriginal
communities could conceivably use this right to create non-liberal regimes.
Before we explore this possibility (under the general concern that Aboriginal
rights might contain governance rights which could conflict with the liberal
program), let us flesh out a remark made earlier about the power of Canadian
governments to limit Aboriginal collective rights when they threaten the interests
others may hold, wrapping up this overview of Aboriginal rights and title with a
few words on the power of the government to infringe these rights.
Some expected that the constitutionalization of Aboriginal rights would
significantly strengthen protection for Aboriginal rights such that legislative
infringement would become difficult, if not impossible, to justify.51 In Sparrow,
however, the Supreme Court announced that Aboriginal rights would be subject
to legislative interference and began to devise a test for justifying infringement.52
Refined in recent cases,53 one can summarize the situation by stating that when
the exercise of an Aboriginal right threatens the continued use of a resource by
others with deemed-legitimate interests, the legislature may bring concerns about
economic development and regional fairness to the fore,54 and institute legislation
which promotes these objectives (so long as the Crown ensures that it meets its
49. Adams, supra note 37 at para. 25; Delgamuukw, supra note 37 at paras. 137-138.
50. Delgamuukw, ibid. at para. 168.
51. B. Slattery, “The Constitutional Guarantee of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights” (1983) 8 Queen’s L.J.
232.
52. Sparrow, supra note 37 at paras. 62-83.
53. Most significantly, in Gladstone, supra note 43 at paras. 61-64.
54. Ibid. at para. 75.
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fiduciary obligations, “respecting” the existence of the Aboriginal rights55).
Conversely, when exercise of the right makes limited demands on the resource in
question, the legislature may only control the right in the interests of such
matters as conservation and safety.
When the Aboriginal right at issue is Aboriginal title, the power of Canadian
governments to justifiably infringe is at its maximum, as title is exclusive in
nature, potentially interfering with other deemed-legitimate interests in the lands
in question. Legislatures may, then, act to limit this title in the furtherance of
such objectives as economic development and regional fairness, acting to
promote, for example, hydroelectric projects and the “settlement of foreign
populations.”56 In so acting, the Crown must meet its fiduciary obligations to the
title-holders, which the Supreme Court has spelled out as requiring that the
Crown, depending on the fact situation and the nature of the title-interest being
disrupted, (a) involve the Aboriginal community in the infringing activity, (b)
consult with the title-holders to determine their interests (and perhaps integrate
these interests into the contemplated use of the lands), and (c) compensate if an
economic aspect of title is unavoidably disrupted.57
With this overview of the process by which the Crown may justifiably
infringe Aboriginal and treaty rights (especially those which may vigorously
interact with the interests of non-Aboriginals), the ground is laid for an
investigation into how the law translates liberal theory into an approach to both
defining the problem around, and setting out the solution to, Aboriginal interests
in Canada.

Liberalism Defines the Problem and Sets out the Solution
The emerging nature of Aboriginal rights illustrates the thesis that liberal theory
underlies the law. We can pull back a step to note the law does not attempt to
address centuries of colonial rule or attempt to address the question of the
justification of the exercise of authority over Aboriginal peoples.58 These are
questions to which the law is not only reluctant to turn, but with which it is said
to be ill-equipped to deal.59 Often the reluctance is said to be a matter of
competence, as such matters are said to be essentially political, not judicable.60

Ibid. at paras. 62-63.
Delgamuukw, supra note 37 at para. 165.
Ibid. at paras. 167-169.
“Sovereignty’s Alchemy”, supra note 1; “Interpretative Monopolies”, supra note 1, Kent McNeil,
“Envisaging Constitutional Space for Aboriginal Governments” (1993) 19 Queen’s L.J. 95, reprinted
in K. McNeil, Emerging Justice?: Essays on Indigenous Rights in Canada and Australia (Saskatoon:
Native Law Centre, 2001) 184; Patrick Macklem, “First Nations Self-Government and the Borders of
the Canadian Legal Imagination” (1991) 36 McGill L.J. 382.
59. The Court attempts to sidestep such issues with these sorts of claims: see, for example, Calder v.
British Columbia (A.G.), [1973] S.C.R. 313 [hereinafter Calder].
60. Courts may take notice, for example, of the Act of State doctrine, which is a procedural bar to any
domestic action challenging the manner by which the sovereign power acquired territory or
jurisdiction. This doctrine was considered, though found inapplicable on the facts in Calder, ibid.

55.
56.
57.
58.
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Why the law refuses to consider these much larger issues is not essential
here.61 The key point is that the law sets itself out as capable of dealing with
certain sorts of matters within society, the assumption being that larger issues
about the legitimacy of the state and its history of dealings with Aboriginal
peoples are not its province. What the law turns to, then, are essentially problems
it can define in liberal terms. It sets itself the project of finding the appropriate
accommodation for Aboriginal rights within society.
This is an essentially liberal project in two respects. First, the problem is
conceptualized as one about interests, interests which may be such as to ground
rights if they are recognized as legitimately imposing obligations on others.62
Aboriginal people are thought of as having legitimate interests in (a) resources
and, perhaps, (b) a degree of control over these resources and certain aspects of
their lives. Second, the fact that Aboriginal peoples have valid claims to
resources and control is understood to require no more than that an appropriate
accommodation for these claims be forthcoming. This was evident in our
discussion of justifiable legislative infringement of Aboriginal rights.
The law is conceptualized as essentially an ordering system (and is built
around this conception); its primary task is to ensure the fair allocation of
resources to parties with valid interests, so they may then pursue projects
involving these interests, thereby facilitating the self-creation of their lives. As
much as possible the law is not employed to dictate what sorts of projects parties
might consider, as that would interfere with their autonomy, their essential nature
as self-creating beings.63 Similarly the law, as much as possible, is not used to
promote any particular project(s) in which individual parties may engage. The
law acts as one institution in a liberal society, a society whose structure is meant
to facilitate the individual pursuit of what each deems to be worthy projects.
We have seen that the general conceptualization of Aboriginal rights, as
collective in nature, fits uneasily into this vision of the law. We have also seen
that the law has reacted in such a way as to minimize the tension between
collective Aboriginal rights and individual rights. Over the past twenty years it
has (a) generally restricted the scope of Aboriginal rights to activities, thereby
minimizing opportunities for direct challenges to non-Aboriginals as they go
about using resources in furthering their projects, (b) protected Aboriginal
resource rights along liberal lines, thereby maintaining the liberal structure of
society, (c) balanced what little protection it offered with the power of the
legislature to interfere with these rights, promoting the distribution of resources
61. This is not to say, of course, that these are not the most important questions facing Canada as a
constitutional democracy, as they go to the heart of its ability to justify its existence and internal
authority. See, on the question of authority, “Authority of Law”, supra note 5.
62. This is to work within the interest theory approach to understanding rights, which seems appropriate,
given the treatment of rights in such cases as Gladstone, supra note 43. See Leon Trakman and Sean
Gatien, Rights and Responsibilities (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999) [hereinafter Rights
and Responsibilities] for an assessment of this approach to rights within a liberal framework and an
argument for an alternative approach to rights focused on responsibilities.
63. The law may restrict the pursuit of projects when these unjustifiably interfere with the well-being of
other individuals. Making such decisions may require resolving conflicts between rights.
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from potentially non-liberal Aboriginal communities to non-Aboriginals, all in
the name of treating legitimate interests equally and (d) avoided those claimed
rights, Aboriginal governance rights, which might seriously challenge the very
liberal structure of society.64 In conceptualizing the problem as one about the fair
allocation of resources, so that parties may get on with the business of pursuing
value-generating projects, the law has attempted to envelop the situation in
liberal garb.
This begins to explain the source of the perception that the law acts to hinder
Aboriginal peoples’ aspirations. To argue, though, that this points to something
problematic, that this perception indicates a problem with the structuring of
Canadian society, requires much more. Some might argue, for example, that
justice requires no more than that Aboriginal rights be protected in the manner
which the courts have developed, as this allows Aboriginal peoples to continue to
live as their ancestors did,65 while assisting in the liberalization of their societies,
thereby creating conditions necessary for the protection of the essential interest
each Aboriginal person has in living a good life. What grounds the perception
that the law is both alien and oppressive? Is it simply misguided, based in an
unwillingness to accept that the law is working towards a fair accommodation of
Aboriginal interests in Canadian society? What could be problematic about the
project of liberalization, since it offers Aboriginal people an opportunity to
“modernize” their societies, creating regimes which provide individuals the
freedom to both re-evaluate their projects and beliefs, and to reconstitute
themselves and their lives accordingly? Is this not the only way by which
individuals can work towards bettering their lives?

IV

LAW, THEORY AND ABORIGINAL PEOPLES

The Liberalization of Aboriginal Societies
The perception of oppression is grounded in the liberalization of Aboriginal
society. The problem lies with both liberal theory itself, as a theory about how
people ought to structure their communities and societies, and its application to
Aboriginal peoples. It is the liberalization of Aboriginal societies through the
application to their interests of a liberal legal regime that generates problems, and
hence the perception. These problems can begin to be understood from within
liberal theory, though full appreciation comes from acknowledgment of cultural
differences ignored by liberalism. Consider, for example, the question of
autonomy. Liberalizing Aboriginal societies through the deployment of a legal
regime which translates Aboriginal claims into rights to be ordered in society
64.

65.

It should be noted as well that the judiciary has consistently and forcefully called for negotiations as
the solution to the problem of working out the place of Aboriginal peoples in Canada. See
Delgamuukw, supra note 37 at para. 186; and R. v. Marshall [1999] 3 S.C.R. 533 [Motion for
Rehearing] at para. 22.
The best that can be accomplished, given the many demands on resources in a modern capitalist
state.
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seems to come rather close to the imposition of belief-structures on Aboriginal
peoples.66 What of the liberal injunction against imposing on individuals theories
about how to live their lives? Where do we find in the project of liberalization
respect for the autonomy of Aboriginal peoples?
Problems around cultural differences are more difficult to articulate. It is not
just that Aboriginal peoples live within belief-systems that prioritize the
community over individuals, though when understood correctly that is so.67 It is
that fundamental principles underlying liberalism are alien to the beliefstructures of Aboriginal peoples. Emerging from a combination of wisdom
gleaned from mythological time and thousands of years spent reflecting on the
best ways to live are visions of ways of life which are considered completely
adequate to the task at hand. Reasons liberal theorists advance for structuring
society around the notion of a “context of choice”68 are absent in Aboriginal
communities. While some experimentation in living is both inevitable and
worthwhile, within Aboriginal societies the broad strokes of how to live the good
life have been worked out. Liberalizing Aboriginal societies is, then, both
inappropriate and threatening. If Aboriginal societies were naturally structured
according to theories of the right and good grounded in the same reasons and
considerations grounding fundamental liberal principles, laying down over these
societies a legal liberal regime would not be an imposition, for it would coincide
with the nature of Aboriginal societies. It would not act to displace their sense of
who they are, their power of self-definition. This is something liberal theorists
should be able to acknowledge, but only if they can understand and accept that
other societies may be grounded in belief-systems completely distinct from their
world-views.
We will consider these two problems in turn, though as we explore the
suggestion that the liberalization of Aboriginal societies disrespects the
autonomy of Aboriginal peoples we will inevitably slide into the second
objection. The gulf separating the cultures of Aboriginal peoples from the
“culture” of liberalism feeds into the disrespect propagated by liberalism,
disrespect that can be couched in the language of oppression and denial of
autonomy.

66. See, for example, Leon Trakman, “Transforming Liberal Rights: Taking Account of Native
Cultures” (1997) 42 Buffalo L. Rev. 189, reworked into Chapter 5 of Rights and Responsibilities,
supra note 62.
67. On the dangers of unreflectively using concepts grounded in the Western tradition to understand
Aboriginal institutions and structures, see Peace, Power, Righteousness, supra note 1; “Interpretative
Monopolies”, supra note 1; and Journeying Forward, supra note 1.
68. Liberalism, Community and Culture, supra note 8 at 10-13 and 162-181.
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Concerns About Autonomy
Disrespecting the Autonomy of Aboriginal Communities
Can it make any difference that we are considering the restructuring of societies
and not attempts to force any particular individual to live his or her life in some
particular way? Something like this is offered by Will Kymlicka as a solution to
the problem of apparent imposition in both Liberalism, Community and Culture69
and Multicultural Citizenship.70
In constructing a liberal defense of the protection of culture Kymlicka has to
demonstrate that cultures have some value. While one could try to locate a
measure of intrinsic value in culture, Kymlicka dismisses that project, for
cultures are simply not moral beings, those entities which have value inhere in
them—only individuals are capable of possessing intrinsic value.71 Cultures, then,
must be argued to have some instrumental value, some value located in their role
in providing value to individuals. Kymlicka finds such value in the manner by
which culture provides the context wherein individual choice can be made.
Culture provides both the setting in which individuals make choices and a range
of options from which individuals can choose.72
Insofar as Aboriginal societies constrain individual liberty, liberalizing
Aboriginal societies, Kymlicka argues, does not remove something valuable
from the lives of Aboriginal peoples, for any pre-existing non-liberal cultures
they might enjoy bear no value whatsoever, either intrinsic or instrumental.73
Rather, the liberalization of Aboriginal societies is conceived of as the bestowing
of a great gift—indeed the greatest gift that could be offered—in that it
transforms worthless cultures into worlds in which Aboriginal people, from
within, can begin to find meaning and value in their lives.
Of course Kymlicka denies that the liberalization of Aboriginal societies
would radically transform the cultural bases upon which Aboriginal peoples
structure their lives. He maintains that liberalization only opens up non-liberal
societies, allowing individuals within to flourish and grow.74 The basic cultural
markers, however, would remain constant, as language, narrative and group
identity would all remain untouched. Certain customs would undoubtedly have to
change (customs which unduly limit the ability of individuals to engage in selftransformative quests to examine and, if necessary, recreate their lives), but such
changes would not undercut the cultures of Aboriginal peoples, for cultures

69. Ibid.
70. Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995)
[hereinafter Multicultural Citizenship]. In this later work Kymlicka seems to find reason to believe in
certain circumstances (of systemic disadvantage felt by “national minorities,” those peoples not
immigrant populations), liberal societies would be acting improperly if they were to go against
choices exhibited by these cultures (at 113).
71. Liberalism, Community and Culture, supra note 8 at 162.
72. Ibid. at 165-171.
73. Ibid. at 169-171.
74. Ibid. at 163-164, 172.
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routinely and consistently alter incrementally over time, with no suggestion that
such incremental change impacts on the continuity of these cultures.75
Does it matter if Aboriginal peoples think that something valuable is lost in
the process of liberalizing their societies? Can the liberal apologist maintain that
any perception of loss is misplaced, that nothing of value is being eliminated and
that the process of liberalization is for the best for Aboriginal societies,
regardless of how these societies might view the matter? Can the liberal
apologist continue to maintain this position if liberal transformation seems to
unhinge Aboriginal societies, leaving them bereft of their former cultural
foundations, mere vessels for lost souls? These questions will be reintroduced
when we turn to the issue of the differential between liberal theory and the
underpinnings of Aboriginal societies.
For the moment let us consider concerns of a general nature with the
universal claim that no culture has any inherent value. This claim has fostered
considerable discussion over the last few decades—being at the heart, for
example, of the debate between liberals and communitarians. Communitarians
have argued, in a wide variety of ways,76 that culture plays a vital role in forming
the individual and that liberalism’s apparent privileging of the individual is
mistaken.77 Liberals have responded of late with strategies akin to Kymlicka’s,
arguing that cultures do have an important role to play in forming the individual,
but restricting this role to an instrumental position.78 The locus of moral value
remains the individual moral agent. Kymlicka’s approach makes much not only
of the instrumental value of culture, but of a corollary, the interchangeability of
culture. Only the “super-culture,” the liberal culture which may encompass many
sub-cultures, has any static value (though again, the value lies not in the liberal
structure itself, but in its ability to foster personal self-examination and growth).
All other cultures only have value insofar as they are currently vested with value
by moral agents.
But can the liberal theorist deny the possibility that a non-liberal cultural
community may be structured such that its community members live lives which
are generally good? Can the liberal theorist argue that the only possible way to
lead a good life is from within liberalized societies? Can the liberal theorist argue
that living in a liberal society is a necessary condition for living a good life,
indeed for there being value in one’s life? The point is not so much about the
chances of living a good life—after all, chances may be greater in liberal
societies, though that is at least debatable—but about our purported inability to
know what the good life entails, upon which both liberal theory and the liberal
75. Ibid. at 167: Kymlicka provides the example of the “radical transformation” of French-Canadian
culture in the 1960’s.
76. See, for example, Charles Taylor, “Atomism” in Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical
Papers, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Liberalism and the Limits of Justice,
supra note 11; Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (London: Duckworth,
1985); and Roberto Unger, Knowledge and Politics (New York: Free Press, 1975).
77. Something along the lines of this debate, though particularized, will be engaged when we turn to the
nature of Aboriginal societies and their fundamental opposition to certain foundational liberal tenets.
78. See, for example, Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986).

94

Indigenous Law Journal

Vol. 2

project rest. Given that we do not know the nature of the good life, how can the
liberal theorist be convincing when arguing that non-liberal societies cannot be
structured so as to generally facilitate the attainment of good modes of living? Is
it sufficient to argue that a non-liberal society cannot know it promotes forms of
living which are good? Would it not be sufficient for a non-liberal society to
respond with claims of deep-rooted beliefs in the value of its ways of living, and
the deep sense of meaning (and attendant sense of well-being) that living within
these ways fosters? What measure of success in living good lives would the
liberal theorist employ? If the liberal theorist has a means whereby she can
measure the success of any particular mode of living for its “goodness” quotient,
such that she can argue convincingly that a non-liberal society is actually not
fostering good ways of living, why the need for liberalized societies, for the
creation of a context of choice?
We noted earlier several possible liberal responses to this challenge. First,
the liberal theorist may argue that our fallible faculties prevent us from erasing
all doubt about whether our current values and beliefs about living are mistaken.
Absent certainty in this matter we must all live within liberal societies, which
facilitate our re-examination of values and beliefs currently held, and the
transformation of our beliefs if found wanting. Second, the liberal theorist may
argue that a precondition for living a good life is having chosen that way of life,
so even if the way of living is “good,” it cannot have value unless chosen by the
individual in society. The liberal theorist may focus attention on the act of
choosing ways of living, arguing that what is important is not just that there are,
objectively speaking, good ways of living, but that there are potentially good
ways of living, each subjectively determined, which crystallize into good ways of
living when freely chosen. That is, one might imagine the liberal theorist arguing
that it is the act of choosing to live a certain way that essentially vests that mode
of living with value (for me). The good way of living is just that way of living I
have reasoned to be valuable and currently chosen to follow. Since non-liberal
societies (purportedly) deny individuals the ability to choose the ways of life
they may wish to adopt, such societies cannot foster good ways of living.
As we noted earlier, however, the latter argument places the liberal
enterprise on the thin edge of a sword, for it threatens to empty the concept of the
“good life” of any meaning, making the liberal project nonsensical. If what is a
good life is deemed to depend too heavily on the act of choosing how to live,
even if this is based on my rational assessment of the goodness I perceive in this
way of living, all ways of living may come to be seen as potentially good. The
only strong constraint on my living a good life would be circumstances, as I
might find myself incapable of living a life I would freely choose (I may find
myself in prison, for example). Once I had chosen to live a certain way, however,
I would have stamped that life with value (to me), until the day I decide it is no
longer worth that stamp (the reasons for my so deciding being fairly unimportant,
other than that they are “my reasons”), and I move on to another way of living,
thinly grounded in reason. Furthermore, if the distinction the liberal wishes to
make does not hold, and the good life is dependent too heavily on having been
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chosen and not so much on its having been discovered, we might imagine society
more efficiently structured so as to provide for a range of options (the content of
which is relatively unimportant), so that each could exercise his or her will in
choosing. The liberal theorist, however, does not envision individuals going
beyond good and evil, self-creating not only their ways of living but the very
values upon which they decide their lives are worth living. The liberal theorist
desperately wants to maintain the key distinction, to adhere to the notions that
there are ways of living which have some measure of inherent goodness, and that
there exists a valuational spectrum of ways of living. There may still be a
measure of subjectivity, in that this way of life that is good for me may not be as
good for another, but that would be the result of differences between the
constitution and/or circumstances of me and the other, not the value of the way
of life for people like me, situated in my sort of circumstances. As such the
liberal project must offer the individual the opportunity to search as far and wide
as possible, for a valuable thing—a good way of living—is sought, and we must
not place barriers in the way of discovering it.
The liberal theorist can continue to advance the notion that the individual
must choose the values and projects which structure his or her life in order for
that life to have meaning and value to that individual, arguing perhaps that ways
of life chosen are in themselves objects possessed of value, but such that they
must be chosen in order for that value to be realized. This, however, will not
suffice to buttress the liberal project of constructing society in order to facilitate
our individual searching for good ways of living, for a much deeper explication
of the link between value in living a way of life and the process of choosing that
way must be forthcoming in light of the existence of non-liberal societies in
which the members believe they know how to lead good lives. For such
societies—in which people believe that if a way of life is known to be good, and
living through this way is fulfilling, then this is sufficient for this way of life to
be good—the liberal project is not necessary. If ways of life known to be good
can be used as guides in the construction of society, if the knowledge about how
to lead good lives can be appropriately passed from elders to the young and
furthermore, if individuals living in these societies have other opportunities for
the exercise of their capacities as rational and free moral agents, would it make
any sense to sacrifice the societal good thereby generated in the world so that
individuals can pursue individual searches for the good life, searches which are
unnecessary? This is a particularly troublesome contention when we consider a
society structured around the transmission from elders to the young of
knowledge about how to live good lives, transmission which is non-coercive and
enlightening, and which merely leads the young to knowledge, which they then
freely and independently accept.
We will return to this later, when we explore the cultural differences tied up
in this argument, those which underscore the non-liberal evaluations providing
the necessary strength. First, we need to consider the possibility that a form of
liberal theory could (a) acknowledge that the autonomy of Aboriginal peoples is
threatened by the imposition of liberal structures on Aboriginal societies, yet (b)
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devise a liberal response. One attempt is by way of developing a theory of group
autonomy to explain the nature of the problem which ensues when one culture
attempts to impose its cultural choices on another.
The Notion of Group Autonomy
In examining inter-cultural struggles, Denise Reaume takes issue with
Kymlicka’s liberal defense of culture, arguing that Kymlicka only argues for the
protection of some culture, culture “in the abstract.”79 His approach provides no
protection for the content of any particular culture. This is understandable, given
that Kymlicka has an instrumental vision of the value of culture, but Reaume
argues this vision conflicts with the claim that culture is valuable in that it acts
(partly at least) to form the identity of the individual. Reaume suggests moving
away from the claim that “culture is constitutive of identity”80 (at least as a basis
for defending culture) to the notion that any particular culture is the expression of
the will of the cultural community, and so demands respect as expressive of
group autonomy.
Reaume locates value in culture by claiming that the community is
analogous to the individual and arguing that cultural communities make
decisions about the values they cherish and wish to promote, decisions which
exhibit the group acting as a moral being.81 As we value the autonomy of
individuals and respect their choices, so too must we value the autonomy of the
community and respect its choices. In this way, Reaume argues for the protection
of particular cultural instantiations as expressive of the autonomy of the cultural
community.82 Once cultural communities are acknowledged to have value
because of their ability to make choices, the task of the liberal state is reimagined, for it must work out some structure wherein both individual and
community pursuits of the good life may be promoted. Reaume suggests, then,
that this is the first step on the road to developing an appropriate theory of justice
between cultures.83
There are those who challenge this sort of approach to the protection of
culture as inventing metaphysical beings. Dworkin, for example, questions
approaches which posit moral beings beyond the human individual.84 In what
sense is there an actual collective being, some piece of furniture in the moral
universe capable of forming beliefs and sensing value, of thinking about options

79.

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Denise Reaume, “Justice Between Cultures: Autonomy and the Protection of Cultural Affiliation”
(1995) 29:1 U.B.C. L. Rev. 117, reprinted in N. Larsen and B. Burtch, eds., Law in Society:
Canadian Readings (Toronto: Harcourt Brace, 1999) 194 [hereinafter “Justice Between Cultures”].
Ibid. at 201.
Ibid. at 204-206.
Ibid. at 206.
Ibid. at 210-211.
Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 2000) [hereinafter Sovereign Virtue].
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and setting out plans, of “experiencing a life” independent of the individuals that
make up the collectivity?85
There are other concerns more germane to this work.86 One concern with this
approach to the perception that liberalizing Aboriginal society is oppressive is
that it is prescriptive, not descriptive. The law does not imagine itself protecting
Aboriginal rights because this is required to respect the autonomy of Aboriginal
communities. It acts to protect these rights because Aboriginal peoples were
“here first,” they find themselves in a disadvantageous position, and they need an
opportunity to work their way into liberal society in a fair manner. If the law
were interested in protecting Aboriginal rights because doing so respected the
autonomy of Aboriginal peoples, it would have a more sophisticated view of
culture (allowing for the evolution of Aboriginal society past contact with
Europeans, so that Aboriginal rights would be grounded in contemporary
Aboriginal societies currently exercising their decision-making ability87) and it
would be working to develop a sophisticated theory of justice between cultures.
Its project, however, is to pull Aboriginal peoples into liberal culture, whether
they want to be within or not.
Of course, being prescriptive is not a problem with this approach, but with
the state of the law. More problematic is the vision of the law were the law to
incorporate this approach. As a (purportedly) liberal solution to the perception of
oppression, not only would it likely lead to roughly the same level of protection
Aboriginal interests currently enjoy, it too is both misguided and oppressive.
Reaume argues for a liberal defense of something like protective walls
around minority sub-cultures within a culturally pluralist society. The vision is of
Aboriginal communities immersed in liberal society, but protected from cultural
interference by protective barriers. The walls, however, are only designed to
prevent certain sorts of outside interference and are porous to other intrusions.
Why this might be so is perfectly clear—in grounding value in culture in the
autonomy of cultural communities, Reaume places communities on par
(metaphysically speaking) with individuals. Aboriginal peoples, collectively
speaking, would then be treated as moral beings. While this may sound pleasing,
the ascription of moral agency in the context of a liberal society would translate
into roughly the same sort of protection Aboriginal rights currently enjoy in the
85. Ibid. at 223-227.
86. Besides the difficulty with the metaphysical status of “group-beings,” Reaume’s approach also runs
parallel, in certain respects, with that of C. Larmore in Patterns of Moral Complexity (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1987), a confluence which opens Reaume’s approach to the sort of
challenge to Larmore launched by Kymlicka. To transport Kymlicka’s critique of Larmore to this
context, grounding cultural rights in respect for group autonomy would not make sense of
liberalism’s deep attachment to the freedom of individuals to “dissent and convert” and does not
provide an explanation for why members would be concerned with such freedoms as that of
expression. See Liberalism, Community and Culture, supra note 8 at 59-61.
87. The current test for Aboriginal rights discounts claimed rights if they are found to be the product of
European influence (as they are not then “Aboriginal”). Grounding Aboriginal rights in the
autonomy of the community, however, would allow for contemporary rights with European
influences, when the nature of these rights is recognized to be the product of autonomous choices of
the community.
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law.88 As moral beings inhabiting a liberal society, Aboriginal communities
would see their interests treated in the same way as the interests of individual
moral agents in liberal societies, which translates into the protection of some
interests and not others, depending on the circumstances and the nature of the
interests.89 While Reaume has yet to see how a theory of inter-cultural justice
would fully develop, within a liberal society its broad outlines should be clear
enough: the rights of Aboriginal communities would be weighed and balanced
against those of both individuals and other communities exhibiting the necessary
features of decision-making.
This is really only to note how Reaume’s approach attempts to fit itself
under liberal theory. How this is a peculiarly dangerous matter to Aboriginal
societies is discussed in the next section, when the philosophical underpinnings
of liberal theory (as one intellectual stream in the Western tradition) are explored
in relation to Aboriginal world-views. At this juncture we can focus on how this
approach misplaces concern over group autonomy. Aboriginal peoples hold an
interest in having their collective decisions respected, and so one could say they
adhere to the notion that group autonomy ought to be accorded value.90 The
autonomous powers Aboriginal societies would hold most dear, however, are not
powers to make decisions about how to live their collective lives (though
obviously these are enormously important powers that should demand respect),
but rather powers necessary to maintain and strengthen their identities. Insofar as
decisions about how to live their collective lives are manifestations of their
assertions of identity, these sorts of decisions are vitally important. But the
power to control their destinies as Aboriginal peoples, to maintain control over
their self-definition, must be fundamental, for otherwise we could imagine a
people being constructed by another. If Aboriginal communities lose the power
to control their self-definition they lose themselves—they effectively become
“another.” This is the dissolution of the self (here a collective self, culturally
defined), a loss of autonomy which spells out into a loss of self.
One can appreciate the priority of the power of self-definition by contrasting
two situations. Imagine a people completely constrained in relation to what they
might choose to do, yet still in retention of the power to control who they are—
these people press on, moving towards the hopeful day when they can live as
they would decide to do. Contrast this with a people “free” to do as they please,
but no longer in control of the tools and structures necessary to maintaining their
sense of who they are. These people will struggle to continue on as a people.
While talk of a line between the power to control how to live and the power
over self-definition makes sense, it should be born in mind that the two are
intimately paired, for a people will generally define themselves as a matter of
88.

Patrick Macklem offers a similar defense of Aboriginal rights (to be worked into the constitutional
order of Canada) in his Indigenous Difference and the Constitution of Canada (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 2001).
89. A similar outcome can be noted when liberals attempt to defend collective rights on the basis of
collective interests. See “Collective and Individual Rights”, supra note 30.
90. Which group would not wish to have their collective decisions respected?
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how they decide to control how they live. Regardless of this interrelation,
however, the distinction must be made, for otherwise those who focus on the
autonomous self as that which demands respect shift attention away from the self
as primarily a self-defining being. Reaume, for example, undertakes to focus
attention on the autonomy of Aboriginal peoples insofar as they decide how to
structure their lives, finding value in their being analogous to individual
autonomous beings, and thereby averts attention from the autonomy of
Aboriginal peoples insofar as they control who they are (and live accordingly).
The danger is obvious when one notes that the liberal-minded focus of
Reaume’s approach will naturally act to promote Aboriginal societies as liberalbeings, entities acting to make decisions about how to live the good life, entities
constituted as “selves” which have plans, which think about the values that
underlie these plans, which consider the possibility that their value-system may
be mistaken, and so which continue in their search for better ways to live,
according to carefully examined and re-examined values.91 While Aboriginal
peoples may wish to play around at the edges of how to live their collective lives,
they may not wish, however, to define themselves in terms of the liberal vision
of the ever-searching, creative and choosing agent. They may wish to retain
control over how they define themselves, for otherwise—as they well know—
they cease to be as “selves,” as beings in the world.
Kymlicka’s attempt to argue that liberalizing Aboriginal societies is not
disrespectful seems unsatisfying by itself, for one is left unclear, given liberal
indeterminacy about the nature of the good life, how Aboriginal societies could
be assumed to be devoid of value in themselves (in encompassing forms of life in
which individuals enjoy meaningful and valuable good lives). Insofar as liberal
theorists hold to the existence of good ways of living, they must not fixate on the
act of choosing which way to live (as this threatens to prioritize will over reason,
leaving value in the world suspect) and they must demonstrate how Aboriginal
ways of living are not themselves capable of providing for fulfilment for those
living in these non-liberal communities. As liberalization threatens to undercut
these societies it seems, then, to be an unjustified interference with the autonomy
of Aboriginal peoples. Liberal attempts at making sense of this attack on
autonomy are themselves suspect, as they focus our attention on a vision of
Aboriginal communities as individuals writ large, as beings concerned with
searching for the good life. Given that such strategies threaten to undercut the
autonomy of Aboriginal communities desirous of retaining the power to selfdefine, they too seem oppressive.
To buttress these claims, however, we need to go a level deeper, to explore
cultural differences between Aboriginal societies and liberal culture, to explore
how liberalization can be seen to threaten the very existence of Aboriginal
peoples. We begin by considering how Reaume’s approach to arguing for the
protection of Aboriginal cultures within liberal societies is a peculiarly liberal
solution to the threat of disrespect for the autonomy of Aboriginal peoples. To
91.

This is if Reaume’s picture is fit within the larger liberal vision, though with Aboriginal communities
accorded moral status as individuals writ large.
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better understand the perception of the oppressive nature of liberal theory we
need to dig below liberal theory, considering this vision of the place of value and
the nature of the self. We carry this project to completion, then, by exploring
conceptions of knowledge, truth and the self revealed through the contrast of
liberal thought with “strong” objections which arise within the Western
intellectual stream.

Concerns About Cultural Differences
The misguided and oppressive nature of Reaume’s approach are seen when
considered in its liberal aspects. Once again we must appreciate how liberal
theory and the liberal project underpin this approach, replete with the liberal
vision of the function of the state and the role of law in society. Aboriginal
communities, as moral agents, would be protected from culturally oppressive
acts because they are seen as engaged in the sort of good work that goes on in
liberal societies, the quest for the good life. Since we do not know what the good
life entails, particular cultures—manifesting choices made by collectivities—
must be protected as fellow travellers on this voyage of discovery. It is
interesting to note that value does not lie in the content of the cultures being
protected (though Reaume occasionally speaks as if this might be so92), but in the
capacity of the cultural community to evaluate its own beliefs, principles and
projects, all in the name of self-improvement and self-creation. To envision
Aboriginal cultures as essentially creative moral agents is to impose a conception
of the value of moral agency and culture on Aboriginal peoples, an imposition
which has two flavours. On the one hand, Aboriginal peoples might believe they
have no need to be on such a grand journey, one they believe essentially
completed untold generations ago. On the other hand, even if they had a
comparable vision, to require that this be their vision is to impose conditions on
how they come to think of themselves and to put limits on their ability to selfdefine.
The perception of oppression through the application of a liberal structure
through the law ultimately rests on incompatible theories of (a) knowledge, (b)
the place of value in the world and (c) the self and its relationship to others. Of
these, the contrast between theories about knowledge is fundamental, as beliefs
about the nature of knowledge and its acquisition infuse and ground the differing
world-views of Aboriginal peoples and liberal theorists. The application of
liberal theory through the law must be seen as essentially an attempt to overcome
fundamental cultural differences by sliding below the cultural divide a
“universal” epistemology. This point can be illuminated by considering the
source of theories of knowledge at work in the liberal vision, an illumination
which also serves to illustrate the bottomless divide between the world-views of
92.

“Justice Between Cultures”, supra note 79 at 206.
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Aboriginal peoples and the Western world. Looking at the source of liberal
theory’s tenets shows that while liberal theory may be usefully put to the task of
addressing questions of oppression relating to minority cultures that come into a
liberal society,93 it cannot be used in addressing concerns about the interests of
Aboriginal peoples in Canada, as the forced liberalization of their societies is the
act of oppression at the root of the problem.
Both the depth of the cultural divide and the role it plays in generating the
perception of oppression are illustrated by focusing on a legal theory critical of
liberalism’s content and epistemological grounding, and by considering its
ability to address concerns over perceptions of disrespect of Aboriginal
autonomy. We will see that such a legal theory, seen from an Aboriginal
perspective, exists on the other side of the cultural divide from Aboriginal worldviews. We will also see that until and unless alternative perspectives develop
theories of respect and tolerance grounded in acknowledgment of their own
cultural limits and the potential danger posed by ignoring such limits, they are as
potentially oppressive as those of a liberal stripe.94

Criticism of Liberal Legal Theory
We begin with the claim that the liberalization of Aboriginal societies is
oppressive in that it fails to respect the autonomy of Aboriginal societies and
threatens to undercut the ability of these societies to both determine how they
will live their lives and how they define themselves. How does this challenge to
liberalism sit with critical theoretical challenges to the law which have emerged
over the last few decades? What is the relationship between critical analyses of
the law and this challenge to liberalism? The short answer is that there is little
relationship between them, for the claim of oppression does not challenge the
worth or value of liberal society to those who choose that form of societal
structure, to those whose sub-cultures comfortably exist within the larger liberal
culture. Aboriginal peoples’ challenge to the theory of liberalism, as mistaken or
misguided, is secondary; the primary contention is with the application of liberal
legal regimes to their interests. A longer answer launches us into an exploration
of the divide that separates the intellectual traditions of Aboriginal societies from
the Western world. This provides an opportunity to make clear a number of
points alluded to in previous sections, and to intermesh these with an
examination of ways in which liberal society (and the law) may more
appropriately interact with Aboriginal peoples in Canada.
We are not here so much interested in how critical legal theories criticize the
liberal project and liberalism’s visions of the self and its relationship to
community and the state. While these arguments have some practical utility for
Aboriginal peoples, the concern is that these criticisms might be Trojan horses,
93. Kymlicka himself makes this distinction in Multicultural Citizenship, supra note 70, in his
distinction between national minorities and ethnic communities.
94. This argument attempts to follow and advance some of the lines of argumentation laid out by Mary
Ellen Turpel in “Interpretative Monopolies”, supra note 1.
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ostensibly gifts from apparent well-wishers, bowel-laden with threats to
Aboriginal peoples. We must focus on the epistemic and metaphysical
commitments of critical theorists, and inspect the grounds from which critical
legal theorists launch their attacks on liberal theory and the liberal project.
Bearing in mind that critical theorists are committed to these fundamental
philosophical positions, two questions arise: (1) can the critical legal theorist
recognize a problem when one legal regime built on a particular philosophical
vision of the good and the right attempts to transform societies built on separate
and distinct philosophical visions, a problem which may go so far as to threaten
the existence of the second society? (2) if it can recognize this problem, can it
offer a satisfactory solution? These questions are deliberately stated in general
terms, for critical legal theorists must be prepared to acknowledge that their own
approach to these sorts of issues may be as threatening as liberal theory.
Foundations of Critical Legal Theories

Discussions of critical legal theories typically begin with remarks about the wide
variety of critical positions and the impossibility of saying anything that applies
to them all.95 With this in mind, I want to look at what I take to be certain shared
philosophical premises upon which rest many “second generation” critical legal
theories,96 those grounded, to a greater or lesser degree, in the postmodern
perspective.97 Critical legal theorists challenge the liberal picture of truth and
good life, the self and community.
Truth and the Good Life
Many critical legal theorists can be described as epistemically antifoundationalist in that they reject the modernist project of grounding truth and
knowledge in a foundational bedrock built of empirical, logical or linguistic
bricks. They exist in a stream of contemporary life whose force is carried along
95. In Jurisprudence: Theory and Context (London: Maxwell, 1999) at 203, Brian Bix writes that,
the advocates placed under a single label—‘critical legal studies’ ... share only that (the
label), and a certain distance on some matters from mainstream legal theory. The point is
that on almost any substantive issue or question of methodology, there will be as much
variation or disagreement within those groups as there will be between those groups and
other theorists.
Gary Minda, Postmodern Legal Movements: Law and Jurisprudence at Century’s End (New York:
New York University Press, 1995) at 116-122 [hereinafter Postmodern Legal Movements]. First
generation critical legal theorists were by and large concerned with deconstructing legal discourse to
reveal tensions and contradictions, many finding the “fundamental contradiction” to be between
community and autonomy. Second generation critical legal theorists recognized the inconsistency in
talking of “fundamental contradictions” and the hierarchy of meaning such language introduced, and
concentrated their attentions on deconstructing legal discourse to reveal all patterns of hierarchy,
with the intent of opening up dialogue, illustrating “the infinite possibilities of human existence.”
97. Dennis Patterson offers a clear and concise “analytic account” of postmodernism and its relation to
modernism and legal theory in A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1999) at 375-384.
96.
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by a deeply felt skepticism about the foundationalist project. This skepticism is
so deep it manifests in the belief that there will never be success in the modern
project, that truth claims will never be satisfactorily shown to be descriptions of
an independent external world.98 The problem is not so much about the
truthfulness of propositions—where truth is understood as correspondence
between propositions and the world they purport to represent—rather, it is a
problem in establishing an acceptable process for assessing that correspondence.
It is not that I may not say truthful things, but that I cannot know that I know of
what I speak.
The foundationalist project and critical responses to it have their origins in
fundamental concerns about the status of empirical knowledge. Arguments
underlying moral skepticism differ in form, but tend to be cut of the same cloth:
the focus is on the impossibility of ever adequately identifying objectively true
moral claims, an impossibility tied to the impossibility of ever adequately
establishing a means of measuring the veracity of these claims. Given that we
have no way of knowing what might be a moral truth, some theorists move
beyond the skeptical stance to embrace the denial of moral truth, when
understood as a matter of correspondence. Rather than holding that something is
morally good when it corresponds in some way to “goodness” in the world, the
critical moral theorist redefines what being good might mean, the possibilities
being wide and deep. Generally speaking, however, the possibilities will relate to
the “inner” lives of moral agents, to their beliefs, feelings and interests. It is the
project of defining moral terms in relation to an independent and external world
that is forsaken.
It is difficult for the critical theorist to avoid commitment to some form of
moral relativism, as much as some may wish to do so.99 They can attempt to

98. See, for example, Alan Hutchinson, “From Liberal Chatter to Democratic Conversation” in Law and
the Community, supra note 8. At 167 he writes: “Linguistic concepts are not terms through which to
view and describe an independent reality, but actually constitute that reality.”
Richard Rorty, in explaining how the pragmatist responds to those who define truth as
correspondence between certain sentences and the world itself, pointed out that the “the pragmatist
can only fall back on saying, once again, that many centuries of attempts to explain what
‘correspondence’ is have failed.” Consequences of Pragmatism, supra note 15 at xxvii.
99. The first wave of postmodern critical legal scholars were criticized for focusing all their critical
energies on deconstruction, such that the movement seemed to “... engender a politics of quietism
and irresponsibility that will be long on personal angst and short on social solidarity.” Alan
Hutchinson, Waiting for CORAF: A Critique of Law and Rights (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1995) at 225 [hereinafter Waiting for Coraf]. Hutchinson is describing a critique of critical
legal studies launched by Joel Handler.
Hutchinson undertakes a reconstructive project in Waiting for Coraf, endeavouring to move
beyond deconstructive imperatives, arguing for meaningfulness that can embrace political activism
even when no “external” goal founded in the Truth and elucidated by Reason is present. Throughout
this work he advocates forcefully for a loosely defined “popular democracy.” Relativistic
implications of the underlying skeptical stance can be seen, however, in the last few paragraphs
where he admits:
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translate claims about objective moral truths into claims about deeply held
beliefs, suggesting that what we may dearly believe to be the moral truth of a
matter is just something we refuse to give up, one of a set of beliefs that may go,
for example, towards forming our self-image, that set of propositions that selfreferentially determines who we believe we are. Critical theorists could argue
that these beliefs would then be “true” for us, just as much as anything may be
said to be “true” when understood in this way. These “objective” moral truths
could then be used to evaluate other beliefs, acting as a “higher” set of beliefs
and functioning in a special way within our sphere of beliefs and propositions.100
Alternatively (or simultaneously), the critical theorist could appeal to shared
moral beliefs, attempting to find objectivity in universality. The first strategy
seems, however, to align itself with one understanding of moral relativism, that
what we claim to be “good” is just which we deeply believe, while finding
objectivity in universality requires that universality be forthcoming. While on
some level of abstraction it may be said that we share beliefs about the nature of
the good, this level may be so general as to be practically meaningless.
Alan Hutchinson illuminates one postmodern route around or through this
problem, as he posits a world of localized truths (truths specific not only to
particular times, but to places and peoples), and then advocates that society be
constructed around the project of open and free debate about how we can live
together in light of the plurality of “truths.”101 Unfortunately, Hutchinson
provides neither clues as to why people in multi-cultural societies would be
motivated to work towards such an idealized community, nor suggestions as to
how we would even begin to move towards a society structured according to this
vision.
One might wonder how far apart critical legal theorists and liberal theorists
need be. One might ask, for example, what prevents the liberal theorist from
tossing aside the foundationalist project—accepting that we can never be said to
“know,” in the classical sense, of what we speak—and replacing this with the
[S]trong democracy is not put forward as a candidate to replace liberalism as Canada’s
natural self-image: postmodernism eschews the belief in any single or accurate historical
vision of community. Instead, I champion unreconstructed democracy because it provides
the least-worst match with the non-foundationalist project for a truly pluralist polity and
ensures that transformative struggle will change social conditions as well as the way we
talk about them [at 228].
100. In “How Law is Like Literature” [in W. J. T. Mitchell, ed., The Politics of Interpretation (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1983)], Ronald Dworkin advanced a theory of law as interpretation. In
A Matter of Principle (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985) at 168, Dworkin noted that his
theory could be challenged as developing a notion of interpretation which had it be “… no different
from invention. The distinction between these two activities presupposes that in the case of
interpretation a text exercises some constraint on the result. But on [Dworkin’s] account the text
itself is the product of interpretative judgments.” Dworkin responded by carefully setting out how,
under his theory, interpretative acts embody two levels of conviction, convictions about form and
about substance, with the former serving to constrain the latter. Drawing on an analogy to a “familiar
thesis” in the philosophy of science, Dworkin argued that certain privileged propositions (fixed and
deeply held) serve to ground interpretations, just as “facts” in science (themselves held to “theorydependent”) act to constrain scientific theory. See pages 168-171.
101. Waiting for Coraf, supra note 99 at 20-27, 154-183.
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notion that we have deeply held shared beliefs in the sort of moral “truths”
proclaimed under liberalism.102
Two points clearly distinguish these theories at their roots. First, let us
consider and expand upon an earlier point. There is no room in the critical
theorist’s picture for a metaphysically-objectively determined “good life,” some
way of living which is objectively good for the individual. While an expression
of the nature of the good life may form a deeply held belief, it is nothing more
than this, for there is no possibility of its corresponding with a way of living
which is actually “good.” The critical theorist must translate the quest for the
good life into an expression of the will towards certain plans for living which one
deeply believes to be worthwhile. The contemporary liberal theorist, on the other
hand, will find it very difficult to forsake the foundationalist project, however
impossible the quest for the good life may be (in that we do not seem to have any
means by which to measure the success of our findings). The liberal engineering
project only makes sense if there are individualized good ways of living for
which individual searches are being carried out. We noted earlier that
understanding the search for the good life in terms of creating valuable ways of
life rather than discovering ways of life places will over reason, and that the
sense of the liberal project rests on the search being about more than allowing for
the act of choosing. Engineering society in line with the liberal vision requires
that individuals be free to choose how to live, and that choices range as widely as
possible, since what is sought is in itself valuable.
The second point distinguishing critical from liberal theorists centres on the
difference between liberal and critical notions of the self.
The Self
Critical theorists hold to notions of the self distinct from those of liberal
theorists. For the liberal theorist the self is a distinct and independent being,
holding values and having interests, capable of reflection and self-examination,
essentially interested in “living a good life.” Furthermore, while the individual
may be partially formed within a culture (or a plurality of cultures, overlapping
in a complex pattern), she is still essentially independent, a potentially creative
and dynamic force within the world. The critical theorist challenges this
conception, arguing that there is nothing “essential” about the self, and that there
is no sense to the notion that the self exists independently of the beliefs and

102. This is a plausible reading of Rawls’ mature position. See John Gray, “Rawls’s Anti-Political
Liberalism” in Endgames, supra note 6 at 51-54. Coming at this from the other direction, Hutchinson
can be read as someone concerned that the doctrine of individual liberty has been used by those with
power to subvert the liberal ideal of equality. See Waiting for Coraf, supra note 99.
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thoughts by which she is constituted.103 To say there is something essential is
itself to go against critical dogma, for essentialist claims are meant to express
truths (in the sense of correspondence) about the nature of the human being as
moral agent. A relationship is marked out between talk of fixed characteristics
(necessary qualities of a thing) and there being some objective truth of the matter
(in the foundationalist sense), with this relationship contrasted to that between
talk of fluid characteristics (all qualities of a thing being contingent) and there
being only language and rules, interpretation and re-interpretation. Critical
theorists understand selves, then, to be essentially conceptual loci of language,
power and meaning, themselves subsets of propositions within spheres of
propositions, those subsets of propositions relating to the expression of “selfhood.”104
The self, then, is not some sort of fixed, transcendent being, but a fluid and
dynamic subset of propositions, some perhaps fairly stable, but many—
expressive, say, of our interests and desires—ever-changing, ever-shifting. With
this in mind it should be clear that critical theorists can reach out and embrace
certain communitarian positions, for they can easily enough accept that the self is
constituted by relationships with others, that not only is there not some shining
light within that is the “I,” but that the fluid and dynamic self is defined in terms
of the community and the interrelationships between members of the
community.105 Regardless of whether critical theorists reach out to
communitarians, they oppose the liberal vision of the state, for they question the
liberal picture of the self, some metaphysically objective being that “has”
interests and beliefs, with an “essential interest” in living a good life, searching
103. Postmodern legal theorists challenge the notion of “grand” theories, theories which purport to
explain the ultimate nature of the self, the community and the law. Hutchinson’s attack on liberalism
focuses on the both the false and unsatisfactory theories of the individual and community it
proclaims (Waiting for Coraf, supra note 99 at 24-25), and the manner by which it has employed
such grand theories to ensnare, control and strangle social democracy (Waiting for Coraf, supra note
99 at 7-24). Hutchinson, however, is not merely arguing that these false theories should be replaced
with True ones, for all theories, on the postmodern account, are “local” and “contingent.”
Where does this leave the self? Under Hutchinson’s “Foucaultian-inspired account of power”
the self is constructed within a local power-matrix: “These matrixes help to create the individuals
who use and are used by power, the needs power feigns to satisfy, and the Truth in whose name
power claims to speak.” A. Hutchinson, Dwelling on the Threshold (Toronto: Carswell, 1988) at 270
[hereinafter Dwelling on the Threshold]. If “the self” existed independent of the particularized social
contexts in which these power-matrixes ebb and flow, an objective notion of the “essential” self
might be possible. This Foucaultian line of analysis has as one pillar, however, the argument that “...
the ‘individual’ is a modern invention; the subject is not a fiction, but an artifact.” Ibid. at 275.
104. As discussed in note 103, critical theorists often reject the notion that there is a separate thing called
“the self,” some mysterious metaphysical being sitting behind propositions and beliefs, some “soul in
the machine” which expresses propositions and has beliefs, though not itself a thing within the
sphere of propositions and beliefs. A line of thought emanating from the empiricist has also
questioned this notion, as such a thing can be hard to locate. The self must be found within the
sphere of propositions and beliefs, as when I introspect (itself a conceptual affair), I find not some
sort of being looking back at myself looking in, but merely more beliefs and propositions. This
picture of the self can be traced back at least as far as Hume: see David Hume, An Enquiry
Concerning Human Understanding (New York: P. F. Collier & Son, 1910).
105. See, for example, Richard W. Bauman, “The Communitarian Vision of Critical Legal Studies” in
Law and Community, supra note 8, 9.
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for both what this good life may entail and for the means by which she can bring
this good life into being.

Critical Legal Theory and Aboriginal Peoples
Critical legal theorists of various stripes challenge the epistemic and
metaphysical foundations of liberal theory, arguing not only that the self is not an
individualizable atom and “the good life” an impossible goal, but that
fundamental metaphysical notions of the self and of “essential interests” are
themselves in need of rethinking. Furthermore, critical legal theorists challenge
how we think of legal discourse, discourse taking place within and about the law.
Legal propositions are seen as existing in outer layers of spheres of beliefs,
constantly challenged, constantly being revised and rejected. They are
“essentially contestable;” their very meaning is dependent on who has influence
over the task of providing a platform for communication between languageusers.106 The common slogan that “law is politics” refers to the notion that at
core, the law reflects nothing more than ongoing power-struggles between
competing interests. This can be put in terms of hegemonic discourse, with legal
discourse seen as directed towards persuasion or coercion, to the gaining or
maintaining of power. Those currently with the requisite power over others use
this power to form the law to their advantage, while those oppressed by the
powerful turn to the law as one means by which they may attempt to bring the
powerful down, so they may assume control over the sort of power that allows
them to then turn to using the law as a means of maintaining their new-found or
reclaimed power.
We have noted that in the least a cousin of moral skepticism is at the core of
the liberal tradition, as indeterminacy in relation to moral knowledge (if not
skepticism itself107) is one pillar upholding this tradition. Critical alternatives do
not resolve this problem and even encourage further skepticism—and indeed,
sometimes, moral nihilism.108 This pillar of moral skepticism is missing in the
Aboriginal world. In the traditions of Aboriginal peoples lies the wisdom needed
to live good lives.
There is an intellectual tradition to the cultures of Aboriginal peoples that
places value in the ability to think clearly and carefully, but it is not privileged as
106. See, for example, Dwelling on the Threshold, supra note 103 at 262 (“Legal rationality is no less
constructed than the courts of law themselves. Objective interpretation, bounded or otherwise, is
oxymoronic”); and at 278 (“... different technologies of power not only formalize and organize
knowledge, but ensure its possibility, intelligibility and parameters. As the study of legal reasoning
shows, power finds different ways to produce and hide in the discursive regimes and practices of
knowledge-making.”).
107. Foundations of Liberalism, supra note 14 at 150.
108. Hutchinson acknowledges the challenge of nihilism, and puts great effort into persuading his
audience that even on a Foucaultian path one can see a bright and promising future. See Dwelling on
the Threshold, supra note 103 at 261-293. That he has to expend vast amounts of argumentative
energy in trying to be persuasive demonstrates the depth of this challenge. I leave it up to others to
decide whether he succeeds.
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it came to be in the West, for the intellectual tradition is seen as intermingled
with spiritual traditions, emotional traditions and physical traditions.109
Something is known, something is beyond mere subjective assertion of opinion,
when it satisfies a complex web of criteria, some of which are tied to its having
rational grounds, some to the “feel” and beauty of the truth of the assertion, some
to the connections of this assertion to established ways of living, ways laid down
by “original instructions” and bolstered by the wisdom of those of experience
and reflection.110 From within this tradition not only is much known, but both
means for assessing and a process for coming to knowledge are at hand.111 There
are many things which are acknowledged to be beyond the reach of our
knowledge-gathering abilities, much that is simply “mysterious,” but again the
general extent of knowledge is known, as Aboriginal peoples circumscribe their
knowledge with clear boundaries.112 Within these boundaries systems of belief
provide essential guidance in the task of living good lives, lives which provide

109. The comments made over the next few paragraphs about “Aboriginal cultures” are fashioned on a
very general level, and are not meant to reflect knowledge about the detailed content of any
particular Aboriginal culture, knowledge which I would not be in a position to claim to possess.
From my limited exposure to Aboriginal traditions of various peoples across Canada, I am
comfortable making such general claims and backing them up with written sources. These are claims
about the general framework of beliefs, on such a level of abstraction that they (a) likely apply to
most if not all Aboriginal communities across North America and (b) would most certainly be
accepted as lying within “of what someone may speak” were this test applied to most people with
some knowledge of Aboriginal belief-structures. I always try to limit what I say to what I know, and
here what that encompasses is so primarily because of its generality.
110. See, for example, Peggy V. Beck and Anna L. Walters, The Sacred: Ways of Knowledge Sources of
Life (Tsaile (Navajo Nation), Ariz.: Navajo Community College Press, 1977) [hereinafter The
Sacred]; J. Bopp et al., The Sacred Tree (Lethbridge: Four Worlds International Institute, 1984)
[hereinafter The Sacred Tree]; Eddie Benton Banai, The Mishomis Book: The Vision of the Ojibway
(Minnesota: Indian Country, 1988) [hereinafter The Mishomis Book].
111. See, for example, Charles A. Eastman (Hakadah), Indian Boyhood (New York: Dover, 1971)
(originally published in 1902) [hereinafter Indian Boyhood]; N. Thorpe et al., Thunder on the
Tundra: Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit of the Bathurst Caribou (Vancouver: Generation Printing, 2001)
[hereinafter Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit]; M. Boldt and J. Anthony Long, eds., The Quest for Justice:
Aboriginal Peoples and Aboriginal Rights (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984) [hereinafter
Quest for Justice] (see especially Oren Lyons, “Traditional Native Philosophies Relating to
Aboriginal Rights”); Jean-Guy Goulet, Ways of Knowing: Experience, Knowledge and Power
Among the Dene Tha (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1998) [hereinafter
Experience, Knowledge and Power]; and Alaska Native Ways: What the Elders Have Taught Us
(Portland: Alaska Northwest Books, 2002) (photos by Roy Corral, introduction by Will Mayo, text
by Natives of Alaska) [hereinafter Alaska Native Ways].
112. See, for example, Basil Johnston, The Manitous: The Supernatural World of the Ojibway (New
York: Harper Collins, 1995) [hereinafter The Manitous]; “My Indian Grandmother” in Indian
Boyhood, ibid.; The Sacred, supra note 110; The Mishomis Book, supra note 110; The Sacred Tree,
supra note 110; Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit, ibid.; and Alaska Native Ways, ibid.
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meaning and beauty for both individuals living through them and communities
out of which such lives grow.113
This is not to say that living a good life ever was or is an easy matter—in
Aboriginal communities the ways of living valued and promoted are such as to
require years of gentle instruction, a process of maturation aided by a
community’s careful system of guidance.114 Central to this process of moral
education is building a core sense of responsibility, one which would come to be
an integral part of one’s sense of personal identity.115 One threat of liberalism and
many critical alternatives is to that core sense of responsibility.116 This sense must
be carefully instilled, carefully nurtured and carefully maintained. An individual
possessed of this sense will know what to do and how to act so as to travel the
good path, to live a good life.117 This involves, essentially, doing as one must
towards fellow beings, both human and non-human. The introduction of
liberalism threatens to undercut this carefully balanced existence, for it suggests
to the individual that the community has no inherent value, that others only have
value in relation to one’s own self-examined beliefs and that one has no inherent
responsibilities to any being other than oneself. Critical alternatives, on the other
hand, suggest that the relationship between Aboriginal peoples and the law is
nothing more than a struggle over power, and that the struggles of Aboriginal
113. See, for example, Don Talayesva, Sun Chief: The Autobiography of a Hopi Indian, ed. by L. W.
Simmons (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1942) [hereinafter Sun Chief] (see especially
“Learning to Live” and “The Making of a Man”); Indian Boyhood, ibid.; George Blondin, Yamoria
the Lawmaker: Stories of the Dene (Edmonton: Newest, 1997) [hereinafter Yamoria] (see especially
“Yamoria’s Great Dene Medicine Laws”); Marie Battiste and James Youngblood (Sákéj) Henderson,
Protecting Indigenous Knowledge and Heritage (Saskatoon: Purich, 2000) [hereinafter Protecting
Indigenous Knowledge] (see especially “What is Indigenous Knowledge”); The Sacred, ibid.; The
Mishomis Book, ibid.; and Alaska Native Ways, ibid.
114. See, for example, “Learning to Live” in Sun Chief, ibid.; The Mishomis Book, ibid.; The Sacred Tree,
supra note 110; and Alaska Native Ways, ibid.
115. See, for example, Yamoria, supra note 113; The Sacred, supra note 110; Alaska Native Ways, ibid.;
and Lee Maracle, I Am Woman: A Native Perspective on Sociology and Feminism (Vancouver: Press
Gang, 1996) (see especially “Law, Politics and Tradition”).
116.

Traditional Indian society understood itself as a complex of responsibilities and duties.
The [Indian Civil Rights Act of the United States] merely transposed this belief into a
society based on rights against the government and eliminated any sense of responsibility
that the people might have felt for one another.

Vine DeLoria and Clifford Lytle, The Nations Within: The Past and Future of American Indian
Sovereignty (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984) at 213 [hereinafter The Nations Within],
quoted in Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 62 at 164. See, as well, The Sacred, ibid.
117. How an individual came to this knowledge would vary from Aboriginal society to Aboriginal
society, but both broad principles of education and the content were uniform: “Immediately, and for
some time after (discovering they were to be parents), the sole thought of the parents was in
preparing the child for life. And true civilization lies in the dominance of self and not in the
dominance of other men.” Luther Standing Bear, “Land of the Spotted Eagle” reprinted in F. Turner,
ed., The Portable North American Indian Reader (New York: Penguin Books, 1973) at 570
[hereinafter North American Indian Reader]. As Taiaiake Alfred notes (Peace, Power,
Righteousness, supra note 1 at 133), “The sources and guiding beacons of [I]ndigenous governance
remain the traditional teachings. While specific techniques are unique to each nation, there is a basic
commonality in their essential message of respect.” See also, as examples, Alaska Native Ways,
supra note 111; The Sacred Tree, supra note 110; Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit, supra note 111; and The
Mishomis Book, supra note 110.
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peoples should amount to no more than an attempt to overcome the oppressive
attacks launched by a legal system controlled by dominant society. There is no
question that the relationship between Aboriginal peoples and Canadian society
and the state has been marked by relentless assaults by Canadian institutions on
the integrity of Aboriginal ways of life, and that now energy should go into
regaining control over lives and self-identities. Yet below the struggle lies an
Aboriginal vision which rests on claims to knowledge of the good life, a vision
irreconcilable with the epistemic foundations of critical alternatives.
Critical theorists attack the liberal notion of the self, the independent and
prior entity which has beliefs and values, substituting in its place the fluid,
dynamic and experientially-determined self. There are no “essential interests,” no
aspect of the self that is necessary or fixed, as the self is conceived as entirely
contingent, a mere vessel for “possibility” itself. This can be a very attractive
notion of self for contemporary Aboriginal people, for it permits an unlimited
amount of free play to infuse the modern self-identity of Aboriginal individuals.
In this modern world of inter-mixed and inter-mingled cultures, with Indigenous
peoples around the world struggling to maintain their identities in the face of
massive cultural shock and relentless efforts at cultural assimilation, Aboriginal
people can grasp onto this critical notion of the self, protecting the sense that
there still are many Aboriginal people surviving in the midst of the larger cultural
milieu. Just as there is no self that is fixed and determinate, there is no culture
that is fixed and determinate—the edges of selves and cultures are blurred, with
even the centres open for revision, as cultures meet and interact.
One might wonder, though, what becomes of being Aboriginal. If Aboriginal
people are both individually and collectively little more than contingently
arranged characteristics, all of them “up for grabs,” what ultimately is the marker
of difference between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal societies and the people
that make them up? Here we witness critical theories in their attempt to slide
universal claims under the cultural chasm separating Aboriginal and nonAboriginal societies, threatening the very existence of Aboriginal peoples as
Aboriginal peoples. Unlike the threat from liberal theory, which demands that
Aboriginal peoples see themselves as autonomous entities engaged within the
liberal project, critical theory demands that Aboriginal peoples see themselves as
products of free play. This extends the sense of freedom at play in liberal theory;
as individuals themselves resist being cast in stone, freedom is extended along
lines laid out by critical theorists’ adherence to deeper skeptical beliefs.
Aboriginal peoples, though, have solid ground on which to walk. Tracing
back intellectual footprints reveals a belief system centred on ways of knowing
and bodies of knowledge, which serve to ground both Aboriginal societies and
Aboriginal peoples’ senses of identity. At the heart of Aboriginal belief systems
are senses of responsibility demanding that Aboriginal peoples resist being reconceived, either as liberal moral agents or as free-floating, self-creating
boundary-less beings. While Aboriginal people may feel comfortable with the
communitarian leanings of the critical theorist’s vision (for individuals in
Aboriginal societies are seen as interwoven into intricate webs of relationships,
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the self being defined in its relation to others), nevertheless individuals are
conceptualized in Aboriginal societies as nodes in these webs, as relatively fixed
and determined beings connected by strands of the web. The identity of these
individuals (and the various communities they collectively comprise) is provided
by the responsibilities they have, which work to weave the web of which they are
parts. There are, quite simply, things the individual must do, responsibilities to
family, clan and community that must be respected and that must lead to action.118
Responsibilities act to define a core of the identity of the individual, just as the
existence of a society centred around responsibilities defines the identity of
Aboriginal communities.
We can clearly see the insufficiency and inappropriateness of critical legal
theory in explaining the nature of the law as it is seen by Aboriginal peoples by
considering this picture of how Aboriginal communities would traditionally
structure their societies and how they would pass on knowledge about how to
live good lives from one generation to the next in light of an argument raised by
Michael Sandel in Liberalism and the Limits of Justice.119 In discussing Rawl’s
Theory of Justice,120 Sandel suggests that the “circumstances of justice” (those
empirical conditions which must be present before the need for justice as a virtue
arises) could be absent in a society, in which case the need for justice would be
diminished. In particular, the presence of conflict over scant resources, a
condition required to explain the need for distributive justice, could be
minimized in societies wherein moral education grounded a deep sense of
118. As noted in the core of this paper, Aboriginal societies rest on theories of knowledge and truth
distinct and incommensurable with the West. While an individual brought up in a traditional society
would be careful about what she came to believe as the truth, and it was expected that each
individual would come to the truth about matters by herself, there was an unwavering belief in
certain fundamental moral truths. Once an individual is cognizant of these truths, many of which
involve the need to be responsible and to act appropriately in one’s role in society, questioning them
makes little sense. Those individuals who might do so would likely not have received the sort of
careful moral schooling at work in Aboriginal families, clans and communities. What can be said to
someone who, after years of instruction in mathematics, questions whether when two apples are put
together with two other apples the resulting collection is of four apples? What can one say to
someone who fails to see the truth in the goodness of meeting responsibilities necessary for the
healthy maintenance of the community? This provides a glimpse into how certain issues prominent
in the debate between liberal theorists and communitarians look from an Aboriginal perspective.
Liberals demand a right to exit for those cultures protected within liberal society, so that individuals
within liberalized Aboriginal societies would have the option of leaving should they come to reevaluate their own vision of the good life and find their existence within the Aboriginal community
no longer in line with their goals and values. This right to exit would serve as one essential linchpin
in the project of making Aboriginal societies acceptable sub-cultures within the greater liberal
culture.
But besides the fact that allowing for a right to exit permits individuals to forsake their
responsibilities to family, clan and community (so the community suffers on exit, not the individual),
this act of exiting makes little sense to a balanced traditional community. The individual would have
the sense of responsibility internalized, not on the basis of ideological inculcation, but as a matter of
her moral upbringing and education. For an individual to contemplate exiting, she would have to not
see the wisdom and value in the way of life of the community, and in her role in maintaining that
balance. An Aboriginal community would likely not stop an attempt at exiting, but not because they
saw value in a right to exit, but because they would find the individual lacking in moral sense.
119. Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, supra note 11 at 28-35.
120. A Theory of Justice, supra note 13. The circumstances of justice are discussed at 128-130.
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benevolence towards others. Indeed, Sandel continues, if we imagine such a
society, then actions which undercut the presence of such a society-wide sense of
benevolence, thereby creating the need for justice, could be argued to be
particularly immoral. In Aboriginal societies the sense of benevolence was
fostered through careful education in the wisdom of accepting and living one’s
life in concert with fundamental responsibilities. Canadian society and the
Canadian state devised numerous strategies over the last few centuries designed
to undercut Aboriginal cultures, and in particular Aboriginal processes of moral
education. The result is a world in which the need for justice in Aboriginal
communities between Aboriginal people is overwhelming, but where most
observers do not acknowledge the role that non-Aboriginals have played in
creating the circumstances of justice making this so. The only moral response is
not to provide justice in Aboriginal communities, as this accepts (even endorses)
the enormous wrong committed. Rather, it is to allow Aboriginal communities to
re-connect with their traditions around moral education and to re-institute these
traditions in their communities. This “allowance” would require more than a
space of non-interference, but as well resources suitable to the enormity of the
task.
All of this, however, conflicts with the basic principles espoused in most
“second-generation” critical legal theory. It is an open question, then, whether
critical theorists can acknowledge the existence of a problem when a legal
regime built on a particular theory of the good and the right and grounded in a
particular vision of the self and knowledge is transposed onto a society built on
alternative visions of the self and knowledge. Critical theorists’ visions of
identity, either of the self or the community, are in conflict with Aboriginal
visions. Could these theorists come to understand the need for, and so lend
support to, a legal regime acknowledging the cultural gap?

V

CONCLUSION

Attempts to liberalize Aboriginal societies constitute threats to Aboriginal
peoples as peoples. Aboriginal people must resist efforts to replace their
fundamental belief structures with visions of the good and the right when these
visions rest on epistemic and metaphysical notions alien to the foundations upon
which rest Aboriginal ways of life. Aboriginal people must also be careful,
however, not to simply turn to critical alternatives, as some are as potentially
threatening as liberal theory itself. They too rest on epistemic and metaphysical
beliefs alien to the foundations upon which rest Aboriginal ways of life, and
might ground on such foundations legal regimes which unilaterally define the
“problems” Aboriginal people face and the “solutions” the law develops.
What then is the path forward? The first step was laid out clearly by Mary
Ellen Turpel in Interpretative Monopolies:
When we think of cultural differences between Aboriginal peoples and the Canadian
state and its legal system, we must think of these as problems of conceptual
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reference for which there is no common grounding or authoritative foothold.
Necessarily, we can’t ‘decide’ the substance of cultural differences from a position
of a particular institutional and conceptual cultural framework; each culture is
capable of sensitivity to the basic condition of difference, and should develop crosscultural relations accordingly. ... There is ... the possibility for toleration of
differences and the recognition of autonomous or incommensurable communities. 121

The existence of a condition of difference demands action from both sides of the
cultural divide. On the one side is the requirement that further attempts to impose
universal visions of the nature of knowledge, the self and its relation to
community be curtailed. Critical theorists would likely argue this is asking much
of liberalism, as they argue (quite persuasively, a realist might say) that
liberalism is not so much a theory underlying and animating the law as an
ideology, a mask for deeper mechanisms aimed at placing and maintaining
wealth and power in the hands of a small ruling class. Critical theory itself,
however, is entirely capable of more of the same, as it is easily bent to the task of
subverting Aboriginal power, especially in relation to the power of selfdefinition, the power which must be protected above all others. For second
generation critical legal theorists to move beyond the activity of “trashing,” for
their work to contribute to the struggle of Aboriginal people to find an
appropriate place in Canadian society, they must develop a theory of intercultural relations beginning from the imperative of cultural difference.
On the other side of the cultural divide there is much work for Aboriginal
people. One responsibility incumbent on all Aboriginal people is that set by the
need to resist attempts by others to undercut Aboriginal peoples’ senses of
identity, which means resisting attempts to remove the link Aboriginal people
must always maintain to traditional notions of knowledge, of ways of coming to
know, of the self, and of the place of the self in community. In a sense, then,
Aboriginal people can only continue to be Aboriginal people to the extent they
can maintain within them a deep sense of responsibility to their ancestors and
their descendants. One particular responsibility lies in guarding against attempts
by the state to use the authority of the law and the power of legal discourse to
determine the nature of Aboriginal interests, and how they might be protected by
the law.
It is difficult to say who has the greater task. Liberalism is unlikely to
acknowledge the imperative of cultural difference, especially if critical analyses
pointing to its underlying nature as an ideological mechanism for oppression are
correct. The only glimmer of hope lies in the ability to awaken individuals
working and living within the liberal system to the nature of the threat the
liberalization of Aboriginal societies poses to the essential interest Aboriginal
peoples have in maintaining control over the power of self-identification.
Perhaps the moral sense of such individuals could be put to the task of reconceiving the design of the liberal state, its architectural principles being
reconfigured along lines respecting the cultural divide between Aboriginal and
121. “Interpretative Monopolies”, supra note 1 at 14, 45.
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non-Aboriginal peoples in Canada. To be frank, given the predominance of
liberalism in contemporary society we do not need to consider at this time what
impact critical alternatives could have on the relationship between the law and
Aboriginal people.122 As much, though, as critical legal theorists’ eschew “grand
theory,” they should be willing to sketch out how their position could
accommodate recognition of the imperative of cultural difference.
Aboriginal peoples, on the other hand, have to begin by reconfirming the
existence of, and implications emanating from, the cultural divide separating
their ways of life from those built on certain Western precepts. In other words,
they need to reaffirm the validity of their perception that the law is alien and
oppressive and come to terms with the reasons for the validity of this
perception.123 They then need to acknowledge the responsibilities attendant on
this reconfirmation and re-invigorate their societies in alignment with traditional
wisdom, but in ways which provide for the complexities inherent in living in the
contemporary world.124 The enormity of this task is difficult to grasp,
encompassing as it does (1) the need to avoid the much easier paths laid out by
such seductively attractive alternatives as liberalism and critical theories, while
both (2) rebuilding and strengthening ways of living which are good in
themselves, ways of life which have suffered through relentless assault during
the colonial period and (3) living according to these pathways. While all this rebuilding and re-thinking is going on, Aboriginal peoples must somehow find a
way to live surrounded by peoples living in societies which allow their members
—even encourage them—to be as irresponsible as they wish. Nevertheless, if
Aboriginal peoples are to continue living as Aboriginal people, to hold to the
value of the ways of living of their ancestors, honouring their wisdom and
sacrifice, they must resist coming to think of themselves as simply collections of
122. There are those who argue, however, that liberalism is already in the process of reforming itself, as
western societies begin to construct “post-liberal” structures, perhaps along postmodern lines. Two
who argue in this manner (though with different visions of the nature of “post”-liberalism) are Gary
Minda in Postmodern Legal Movements, supra note 96 and John Gray in Endgames, supra note 6
and Post-Liberalism, supra note 16.
123. Sákéj Henderson puts this in terms of moving towards a postcolonial mentality: see Postcolonial
Indigenous Legal Consciousness, supra note 1.
124. This program of re-invigoration along traditional lines in the modern world is called for by Vine
DeLoria in Custer Died For Your Sins: An Indian Manifesto (Norman: University of Oklahoma
Press, 1988) and The Nations Within, supra note 116. Much of Alfred’s work, Peace, Power,
Righteousness, supra note 1, is an extension of this thought. In discussing representations, especially
those constructed by “histories,” DeLoria writes:
There must be a drive within each minority group to understand its own uniqueness. This
can only be done by examining what experiences were relevant to that group, not what
experiences of white America the group wishes itself to be represented in … Even though
minority groups have suffered in the past by ridiculous characterizations of themselves by
white society, they must not fall into the same trap by simply reversing the process that
has stereotyped them.
Vine DeLoria Jr., “We Talk, You Listen”, reprinted in North American Indian Reader, supra note
117 at 595-596.
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people with interests in and claims to certain rights within the framework of the
Canadian polity, or as communities whose identities can be entirely fluid and
contingent.
Finally, on top of these two separate endeavours is the task of working out
the appropriate relationship between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal societies in
a multi-national Canada. Little can be said a priori about the contours of this
relationship, as it would arise at the confluence of two separate worlds, each
coming to terms with enormous responsibilities and tasks that lead them into this
final endeavour.

